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NEW SOURCES, NEW GROWTH
AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Jeffrey M. Gaba*
In 1972, Congress adopted the Clean Water Act ("CWA").1 Among the
many ambitious goals of the CWA, one stood out. Congress decreed that,
wherever attainable, all waters in the United States were to achieve a level
of water quality that would support aquatic populations and recreation in
and on the water by July 1, 1983.2 Thus was born the goal of "fish-
able/swimmable" waters.
3
The tools necessary to achieve this goal were arguably in place in
1972. 4 Industrial and municipal dischargers were required to meet "technol-
ogy-based" discharge limitations; 5 additional restrictions, if necessary to
achieve fishable/swimmable waters, were to be imposed through the water
quality standards program.6 To be sure, controls on nonpoint sources were
lacking, but with proper planning and political commitment, the CWA pro-
vided powerful tools to achieve water quality goals in the 1980s.7
Didn't happen. Although substantial reductions in the discharge of pol-
lutants can be credited to the CWA, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") has estimated that 35% of streams had not met the "fish-
able/swimmable" goal by the mid-1990s. 8 For several reasons, not the least
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1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The 1972 act was, in fact, adopted as the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution
Control in the United States-State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part 11, 22 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 215 (2003).
2. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2000). In addition, the CWA contains the
goals, among others, of eliminating the discharge of pollutants in navigable waters by 1985 and the
discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts. Id. § 101(a)(l), (3), 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1), (3). We are
still working on those goals as well.
3. See Andreen, supra note 1, at 264.
4. See generally Andreen, supra note 1.
5. Id. at 28 1.
6. Id. at 282.
7. See Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2002).
8. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PROFILE
OF THE 1998 NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY REPORT TO CONGRESS, EPA-84 I-F-00-006 (June
2000). The EPA also estimated that 45% of assessed lakes and 44% of assessed estuaries were "pol-
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being the commitment of citizens to force its implementation, there has
been a renewed effort by the EPA to implement the water quality standards
program and thereby achieve the goal of the CWA. 9
There is currently an ongoing controversy about the future of the water
quality standards program.' 0 For the most part, the focus of this controversy
has been on two closely related issues: control of nonpoint sources and the
development of "total maximum daily loads" ("TMDLs")."1 Nonpoint
sources, such as agricultural runoff, have never been the subject of effective
regulation under the CWA, and they now constitute the major source of
pollution that contributes to the failure to achieve water quality goals.
12
TMDLs are a device to assure attainment of water quality goals by calculat-
ing the amount of allowable pollutants that may be discharged into a water
body and allocating these loads among pollutant sources.' 3 The issues of
nonpoint source control and TMDLs are closely related since the allocation
process can be a vehicle for identifying and implementing necessary non-
point source controls. The Clinton Administration adopted far-reaching
changes to the water quality standards regulations that, among other things,
would have expanded the application of TMDLs to nonpoint sources and
provided a new focus on implementation plans.14 Although most major por-
luted." Id. at 1.
9. See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION (1999) 49-64 (discussing the history of efforts to expand the water quality standards
program).
10. In 1998, the EPA published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that contained an
extended discussion of major water quality standards issues. Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63
Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,743 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) [hereinafter 1998
ANPRM]. In the 1998 ANPRM, the EPA noted:
In recent years there has been a rising level of scrutiny placed on water quality standards and
the State, Tribal and EPA decisions based on water quality standards. The increased scrutiny
comes from virtually all parties affected by water quality-based decisions and is evidenced by
the growing tide of challenges to State standards, EPA policies and guidance, and individual
water quality-based decisions.
Id.
11. HOUCK, supra note 9, at 5.
12. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER QUALITY: FEDERAL ROLE IN
ADDRESSING-AND CONTRIBUTING TO-NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION, GAO/RCED-99-45 (Feb.
1999). The report describes nonpoint source pollution as including "a wide array of land-based activities
such as timber harvesting, grazing, urban development, and agriculture." Id. at 18.
13. See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of TMDLs.
14. Starting in 1999, there was a flurry of regulatory attention to the water quality standards pro-
gram that corresponded with the end of the Clinton Administration. Since it is impossible to keep the
various regulatory actions straight without a scorecard, here is a list of the major actions:
" Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation,
64 Fed. Reg. 46,012 (proposed Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
130) [hereinafter 1999 TMDL Proposal] (proposal addressing major issues relat-
ing to development of TMDLs and nonpoint source controls).
* Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and
Federal Antidegradation Policy in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality
Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,058 (proposed Aug. 23,
1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 124, 131) [hereinafter 1999
NPDES Proposal] (proposal addressing several issues relating to implementation
of the TMDL program in NPDES permits, including a major set of proposals to
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tions of these regulations were blocked by Congress and withdrawn by the
Bush Administration,15 the debate and controversy continues.
One issue has not, however, attracted adequate attention. That is the is-
sue of growth.' 6 How does, and how should, the water quality standards
program deal with either new sources of water pollution or expansion of
discharges by existing sources? This issue implicates two distinct problems.
First, how can growth be allowed on water bodies not yet meeting the fish-
able/swimmable goal? Second, how can water quality be maintained in wa-
ter bodies already meeting the goals? The first problem is now addressed, if
at all, through a policy of reserving pollution load allocations for future
require offsets for any new or significantly expanded dischargers on waters not
meeting water quality standards goals).
* Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support
of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed.
Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124,
130) [hereinafter 2000 TMDL Regulation] (adopting significant changes to the
TMDL program, including a requirement for development of implementation
plans for control of nonpoint sources, and abandoning the 1999 proposal for off-
sets).
" Amendments to Streamline the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Program Regulations: Round Two, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,886 (May 15, 2000) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 22, 117, 122, 123, 124, 125, 144, 270, 271) (adding a
compliance schedule to 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)).
" Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regula-
tion and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Pro-
gram in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management
Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
9, 122, 123, 124, 130) [hereinafter 2003 Withdrawal] (withdrawing the 2000
TMDL regulations and re-establishing the pre-existing water quality standards re-
quirements).
At the end of the process, by the way, the score read: "water quality-zero, status quo-100."
15. Congress, in the Military Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-246, 114 Stat. 511
(2000), prohibited the EPA from using funds to implement the regulation until the prohibition expired on
Sept. 30, 2001. See Delay of Effective Date of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Manage-
ment Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in
Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations; and Revision of the
Date for State Submission of the 2002 List of Impaired Waters, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817 (proposed Aug. 9,
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130). The EPA subsequently withdrew the
regulation. See 2003 Withdrawal, 68 Fed. Reg. at 13,608.
16. To say that the issue has not received adequate attention is not to say that it is unacknowledged
or ignored. As early as 1968, antidegradation policies of the Department of the Interior were directed at a
"new source of pollution or an increased source of pollution." 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742,
36,779 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (quoting 1968 policy). In 1999 the
EPA proposed, and later abandoned, an ambitious "offset" program to allow growth in waters not meet-
ing water quality standards. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, it is fair to say
that the bulk of the discussion of water quality standards has ignored the special problems created by
growth. In its 1998 ANPRM, the EPA used the word "growth" once, and that was in reference to algae.
1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,778. The term "new source" was only used once in a general refer-
ence to antidegradation provisions. Id. at 36,779.
The reasons for the relative inattention to growth issues are not hard to understand. Until re-
cently, virtually the entire water quality standards program was in a state of benign neglect. See HOUCK,
supra note 9, at 49-5 1; Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under
the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1983). Over the last ten years it has been in "catch
up" mode, trying to implement the basics of the program, such as TMDLs. But, as was said of Willie
Loman, "Attention must be paid." ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 56 (Penguin Books 1976).
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growth. 17 The second problem is ostensibly addressed by the EPA's
"antidegradation" policy. This policy is intended to protect existing uses of
water and prevent the degradation of high quality waters. In neither case,
however, has the EPA either established or implemented coherent policies.
But the issue of growth cannot be ignored. Whatever progress is made
towards attaining water quality standards, the attainment and maintenance
of those standards will be affected by population and economic growth and
the resulting increased discharges of pollutants. In other words, water qual-
ity goals are a moving target, and whatever controls are imposed on existing
sources, either the attainment of goals must fail or the growth stopped if
mechanisms are not in place to deal with new discharges.
The purpose of this Article is to explain and explore the means by
which the CWA addresses the problem of growth in connection with the
achievement and maintenance of water quality standards. Section I contains
a brief discussion of the basic structure of the CWA. Section II discusses
those existing water quality standards requirements that most directly affect
the issue of growth. These include two distinct, and largely unrelated, sets
of requirements. First, the Article discusses those provisions that affect the
regulation of new or expanded discharges on waters not yet meeting water
quality goals. These include, among others, the provisions of the TMDL
process that address the allocation of waste loads to account for growth, and
the EPA's aborted proposal to require "offsets" by new or expanding facili-
ties. Second, the Article discusses the effect of the EPA's "antidegradation"
provisions on the ability of new or expanded facilities to discharge into wa-
ters that are now achieving water quality goals. Section III discusses the
relationship between these "attainment" and "maintenance" provisions. Sec-
tion IV discusses some of the challenges faced in revising the water quality
standards program to deal effectively with the issue of growth.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Control Over Point Sources
The major focus of the CWA since its adoption in 1972 has been con-
trol over the discharge of pollutants by "point sources." Point sources in-
clude industrial and municipal facilities that discharge pollutants from pipes
or other discrete sources,' 8 and the basic structure of the CWA as it applies
to these point sources is really quite simple. The discharge of a pollutant
from a point source is illegal unless done in compliance with a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.' 9 At a mini-
17. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text. Perhaps most remarkably, the regulations seem to
actually prohibit any new sources on waters not meeting water quality standards where such allowances
do not exist. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
19. Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (2000). NPDES permits are issued for a maxi-
mum period of five years, and at the end of that period, they are subject to review and reissue. 40 C.F.R.
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mum, this means that every industrial and municipal facility discharging
pollutants into water from a pipe is required to have a federally-mandated
NPDES permit containing limits on the pollutants that may be discharged.
There are essentially two bases by which these discharge limits, known
as effluent limitations, may be included in a permit. First, limits may be
"technology-based., 20 This means that the amount of pollutants that may be
discharged is established based on an assessment of available pollution con-
trol technology. 2' Additionally, effluent limits may be based upon "water
quality standards. 22 This means that the limits are set at a level that is nec-
essary to ensure that a designated level of water quality is met.23 Under the
CWA, all dischargers must meet technology-based limits; more stringent
water quality standards-based limits are included in a permit only if the
technology-based limitations are inadequate to attain water quality stan-
dards.24 NPDES permits are written for a maximum term of five years.25 At
the end of that period, they are subject to renewal and revision.26
Okay, maybe it is not that simple. There are elements in the establish-
ment of both technology-based and water quality standards-based effluent
limitations, as well as nonpoint source planning, that are important to under-
standing the limitations that exist on new or increased discharges.
1. Establishing Technology-Based Limitations
The requirement to achieve technology-based limitations was one of the
great innovations of the 1972 amendments establishing the CWA. Dis-
chargers are to use the best existing technology to control pollution regard-
less of the effect of the discharge on the environment. Technology-based
limits are now largely established on a national basis for classes or catego-
ries of industrial sources; a permit writer just looks up the applicable efflu-
ent limitation in a book of the EPA regulations.27
§ 122.46 (2003). During the permit term, permits may be "reopened" in certain situations to allow revi-
sion of applicable permit requirements. Id. § 122.62. NPDES permits were initially issued by the EPA,
but they may be issued by a state if the state has received delegated authority from the EPA. To date, all
but a handful of states have basic authority to issue NPDES permits to facilities within their jurisdiction.
See Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: State Program Status, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last modified Apr. 14, 2003).
20. Clean Water Act §§ 301(b), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1316 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing the process by
which the EPA develops technology-based limitations).
22. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(l)(C) (2000).
23. See generally Gaba, supra note 16.
24. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313, 1316(2000).
25. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 122.46(a) (2003).
26. Even this statement is somewhat misleading. Under provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act and EPA regulations, an existing permit continues in effect after its expiration if the permittee has
properly applied for renewal. Thus, an existing permit may continue for longer than five years if no
action is taken by the permitting authority. Id. § 122.6. Permits may be modified during their term, but
only for enumerated reasons. Id. § 122.62. It does not appear that revisions to waste load allocations
would justify reopening an existing permit.
27. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (confirming the EPA's ability
to establish uniform, national technology-based effluent limitations). The EPA's industry-specific,
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By definition, technology-based limitations are applied independently
of any impact on local receiving water quality.28 Therefore, new or in-
creased quantities of discharge by a source should not normally affect the
stringency of technology-based limitations. Phrased another way, the re-
quirement to achieve technology-based limits does not, in general, provide a
basis for imposing specific limitations based on the environmental impact
associated with new or expanded sources.
Although technology-based controls do not directly address environ-
mental issues arising from growth, the CWA does distinguish between tech-
nology-based controls on existing sources and new sources. Existing
sources are generally subject to technology-based effluent limits reflecting
either "best available technology" or "best conventional ... technology. 29
The class of "new sources" is subject to new source performance standards
("NSPS") representing "best available demonstrated control technology.,
30
New sources in theory, if not in practice, are subject to more stringent tech-
nology-based limitations in their permits.
Not all new sources are, however, "new sources" under the CWA. A fa-
cility is classified as a "new source" only if it commences construction after
promulgation of a national NSPS.3' If the EPA has not promulgated an
NSPS, a facility, regardless of when it is built, is not a new source. The dis-
tinction between existing and new sources is not based on special concerns
arising from the new addition of pollutants to a water body. Rather, Con-
gress recognized that the ability to use the pollution control equipment dif-
fered between existing and new sources. Existing sources may, as a matter
of practical necessity, be limited to adding some end-of-pipe piece of pollu-
tion control equipment; new sources theoretically have greater flexibility to
include pollution control into the design of the facility. Thus, the new
source/existing source distinction has limited relevance in understanding the
provisions of the CWA that address the special problem of growth.32
technology-based effluent limitation guidelines are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-71 (2003).
28. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting the need to consider
the impact on local receiving water quality in establishing technology-based effluent limitations guide-
lines).
29. Clean Water Act § 301 (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (2000).
30. Id. § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316.
31. Id. § 306(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2). The EPA defines a "new source" at Protection of Envi-
ronment, 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2003). According to this regulation, the applicable date for determining new
source status is whether construction on the source commenced after the date of promulgation of NSPS.
The relevant date is the date of "proposal" only if EPA promulgates a final NSPS within 120 days of
proposal. This strange distinction comes from the language of section 306(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act,
which defines a new source with reference to the date of proposal of an NSPS "if such standard is there-
after promulgated in accordance with this section." Section 306(b)(I)(B) requires promulgation of stan-
dards within 120 days of proposal. If, as is always the case, promulgation does not occur within 120 days
of proposal, the EPA has established the date of promulgation as the relevant date.
32. Despite the limited relevance of the new source/existing source classification for understanding
growth issues, there are aspects of the legal rules applicable to "new sources" that do affect the ability to
limit the new or increased discharge of pollutants. First, the issuance by the EPA of NPDES permits to
"new sources" is subject to the Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") process of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). Clean Water Act § 511(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 137 1(c)(1) (2000). This
means that at least major "new sources" may not receive a federally issued NPDES permit until an EIS is
[Vol. 55:3:651
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Of greater relevance to the issue of growth is the manner in which ef-
fluent limitations are expressed. Under EPA regulations, most effluent limi-
tations in NDPES permits are written to limit the mass of pollutants dis-
charged.33 Thus, in theory, a facility is limited in the total quantity of pollut-
ants that it is allowed to discharge. Mass limits are typically imposed by
expressing the limitations in terms of units of production. Under EPA regu-
lations, these production-based limits are calculated based not upon some
maximum production capacity, but upon "a reasonable measure of actual
production;, 34 mass-based limitations for new sources are calculated based
on estimates of "projected production." 3 In order to account for potential
expansion of production by sources, the regulation authorizes inclusion of
"alternate permit limitations" based on "anticipated" increased or decreased
production levels. 36 Thus, the regulations provide some mechanism to regu-
late anticipated growth within the limits of a permit. Any expansion that
exceeded anticipated levels would require notification to the permit writer
and potentially result in modification of the permit.
37
prepared that evaluates the environmental impact of the operation of the facility. Presumably, this would
include an assessment of the environmental consequences of the new discharges. In contrast, no EIS is
required for the issuance of a permit to an existing source.
The application of NEPA to new sources is less significant than it may seem. The NEPA process
for new sources only applies to EPA-issued permits; permits issued by states that have received NPDES
permit authority are not subject to NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(c)(1)(ii) (2003). See District of Columbia
v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (when state issues NPDES permit, there is no "major Fed-
eral action" and thus no NEPA requirement). To date, the vast majority of states have received this
delegated authority, and thus the scope of the NEPA requirement is limited. See Envtl. Prot. Agency,
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: State Program Status, at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last modified Apr. 14, 2003) (chart of approved states). Fur-
ther, although environmental impacts may be identified through the EIS process, it is far from clear what
authority the EPA has to deny or condition a new source permit based on this information. See Natural
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (limiting the EPA's authority to impose
NPDES permit requirements based on NEPA). Nonetheless, the NEPA requirement does add some
element of review to this class of "new sources."
Second, in something of a quid pro quo for potentially more stringent technology-based limits,
the CWA exempts new sources from more stringent performance standards for ten years after construc-
tion. Clean Water Act § 306(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(d) (2003). Thus, in
some cases there may actually be less authority to increase technology-based limits on new sources than
there is for existing sources.
Finally, there is one significant procedural issue applicable to new sources. These new sources
are not authorized to commence discharging pollutants that are subject to an administrative challenge
until completion of the agency review process. 40 C.F.R. § 124.16(a) (2003). In contrast, existing
sources may continue to discharge during administrative review. Thus, the EPA has asserted greater
authority to control and review new facilities prior to their commencing discharge.
33. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(f) (2003). See, e.g., In re City of San Francisco, 4 E.A.D. 559, 1993 WL
118290 (EPA) (remanding NPDES permit for failure to properly include enforceable mass-based efflu-
ent limitations).
34. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(b)(2)(i) (2003).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 122.45(b)(2)(ii)(A)(1).
37. See id. § 122.4 1()(1)(ii).
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2. Establishing Water Quality Standards-Based Limitations
The water quality standards program mandated by section 303 of the
CWA is the basis for imposition of additional effluent limitations based on
receiving water quality. The derivation of these water quality-standards
based permit limitations is a complex process that follows from a series of
requirements of the CWA.38 First, states are required to establish "desig-
nated uses" for all stream segments within the state.39 These "designated
uses" define the specific goals or purposes of the water body and may in-
clude such uses as a warm water fishery or public drinking water supply.
4
0
The so-called "fishable/swimmable" goal of section 101(a)(2) of the CWA
has been translated by the EPA into a requirement that all waters have a
designated use approximating "fishable/swimmable," unless the state can,
through a use attainability analysis, justify that the goal cannot be met.41
Water segments that are not meeting their designated uses are referred to as
"impaired waters" or "water quality limited segments" ("WQLS").
Designated uses are not, in themselves, a basis for establishing specific
effluent limitations in a permit. Rather, designated uses form the basis for
establishing water quality "criteria." Criteria identify the specific, usually
maximum, concentration of a pollutant that may exist in a water body while
still allowing the designated use to be attained.42 Criteria are generally ex-
pressed as a specific number, but they also may be expressed in other forms,
such as a bioassay or narrative. 43 Regardless of how expressed, most efflu-
ent limitations in permits are derived to ensure that the concentrations of a
pollutant discharged by a source do not cause the criteria value for that pol-
lutant to be exceeded in the water body itself.
Transformation of ambient, instream criteria to an effluent limitation in
a permit requires additional steps. As contemplated by the structure of the
CWA, this transformation is to be accomplished by developing TMDLs that
specify the total mass of a given pollutant that may be discharged into a
defined water body segment.44 TMDLs are mandated on the class of "im-
38. See Clean Water Act § 303(c)-(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e) (2000). The EPA's water quality
standards regulations are found at Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 131 (2003); these regulations
contain requirements relating to establishment of designated use, water quality criteria, and antidegrada-
tion policies. The EPA's water quality management regulations are found at Protection of Environment,
40 C.F.R. § 130; these regulations contain requirements relating to the TMDL and water quality plan-
ning process. See generally WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK: SECOND EDITION, EPA-823-B-
94-005a (Aug. 1994) (hereinafter WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK).
39. See WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 2-1.
40. Id. at 2-1 to 2-4 (discussing the classification of designated uses).
41. See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 131.100) (2003).
42. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 3-I to 3-38.
43. See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (2003).
44. Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000). TMDLs are intended to assure attain-
ment of water quality standards under a variety of conditions. Thus, TMDL calculations are required to
include an assessment of seasonal variation and a margin of safety. Id.
TMDLs are to be based on a designated "critical low flow" that represents the seasonal condi-
tions where instream flow is low. The EPA has traditionally recommended that states base their calcula-
tions on the lowest flows that are expected to occur seven days every ten years (7Q10). WATER QUALITY
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paired" waters not meeting their designated uses.n5 Following derivation of
a TMDL, states are required to allocate the total load among sources.
46
Loads allocated to point sources are known as "wasteload allocations"
("WLAs"). Loads allocated to nonpoint sources are known as "load alloca-
tions" ("LAs"). TMDLs and associated LAs, together with other material
(including an implementation plan) are to be included in the "Continuing
Planning Process" document required by section 303(e).4 7
The process of translating TMDLs into enforceable "water quality-
based effluent limitations" ("WQBELs") seems conceptually straightfor-
ward. The TMDL establishes the total mass of a pollutant that may be dis-
charged into a stream segment.48 The WLA/LA process allocates the allow-
able mass that may be discharged by individual sources. The permit writer
takes the allocated mass and calculates an enforceable mass-based WQBEL.
That is the process generally described by the EPA. A 1996 document, U.S.
EPA NPDES Permit Writers' Manual, provides, as illustration, a TMDL
being divided into pie-shaped wedges applicable to individual point and
nonpoint sources.49 It describes the WLA as "the fraction of a receiving
water's TMDL that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources
.... ,50 In this simplified conception, one would imagine that translating the
WLA into a WQBEL simply involves establishing limits to ensure that no
more than the allocated mass of pollutants is discharged by a source.
This conception is both incomplete, and in many respects, wrong. 5 In
fact, the WLA process can involve substantial, site-specific modeling of the
STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 5-11. The EPA, sadly, approves water quality standards
calculations based on alternative low flows such as 7Q2. Use of 7Q2 weakens the stringency of water
quality-based requirements by allowing greater dilution. This is an issue that deserves more attention
than it has received. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 806 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Va. 1992) (allowing
the EPA to use "harmonic mean" rather than 7Q10 in the particular context of development of a water
quality criterion for dioxin).
45. See Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000). See also 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)
(2003). Identification of the list of impaired waters for which TMDLs must be prepared has been one of
the most contentious issues under the CWA. Section 303(d) requires formal designation of these water
bodies, and the list is subject to review and approval by the EPA. Part of the controversy has involved
the point/nonpoint source debate; must waters that are failing to meet water quality standards due to
pollution from nonpoint sources be designated as impaired and subject to TMDLs? In Pronsolino v.
Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit said yes. What has not received attention is the
relationship, if any, between designation of waters as "impaired" under section 303(d) and the applica-
tion of the EPA's antidegradation policy.
46. Under the EPA's regulations, a TMDL is actually defined to include applicable waste load
allocations and load allocations. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(g)-(i), 130.7(c) (2003).
47. Clean Water Act § 303(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2000).
48. The process of establishing TMDLs is, of course, not at all simple. The EPA has described the
process as "dependent on the location of point sources, available dilution, water quality standards, non-
point source contributions, background conditions, and instream pollutant reactions and effluent toxicity.
All of these factors can affect the allowable mass of the pollutant in the waterbody." ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA-505-2-90-001, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED TOXICS
CONTROL 67 (1991) [hereinafter TSD].
49. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-833-B-96-003, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS' MANUAL 104-105
(1996).
50. Id. at 106-107.
51. Calculation of TMDLs and translation of WLAs into permit limits is obscure, technical, and
critical to understanding the water quality standards process. Most of the literature treats this process the
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effects of a specific discharge, and the process of deriving WQBELs can
involve instream assessment to ensure that water quality criteria are not
exceeded at the boundary of a mixing zone. In other words, the process of
final development of enforceable limits involves a confusing relationship
among development of TMDLs, WLAs, and WQBELs.
The EPA's NPDES Permit Writers' Manual states, for example, that
"[tihe appropriate WLA is determined through an exposure assessment.
Water quality models are the primary tools utilized by regulatory agencies
in conducting an exposure assessment to determine a WLA. Models estab-
lish a quantitative relationship between a waste's load and its impact on
water quality., 52 In other words, the derivation of a WLA is not a simple
allocation of mass, but a process of modeling to ensure that a discharge will
not cause violation of water quality standards in the stream, typically at the
edge of a mixing zone.
The EPA's Technical Support Document for Water Quality-Based
Toxics Control53 describes a complex process of deriving WLAs. In part, it
involves varying schemes for allocating required reductions among
sources. 54 In part, however, it involves site-specific consideration of factors
in which the calculation of a WLA hinges on model assumptions regarding
instream water quality, stream flows, and dispersion of pollutants. 55 Follow-
ing this derivation of a site-specific WLA, the process of calculating the
WQBEL seems largely reduced to consideration of variability within the
source's flow to ensure that the final WQBEL is achievable and ensures
compliance with WLA limits on a consistent basis.56
More confusing is the derivation of a WQBEL in the absence of a pre-
viously approved TMDL/WLA. Since, until recently, few TMDLs had been
adopted, the process of establishing limits has, inevitably, included mecha-
nisms for deriving WQBELs in the absence of a WLA. Indeed, the process
of establishing WQBELS described in the 1991 Technical Support Docu-
ment seems to operate independent of any prior planned allocation of
WLAs. Rather, the WLA process is incorporated into an individual permit
process in which the permit applicant is involved in generating data used to
way high school sex education treats reproduction; it ignores the important stuff. This is not to say that
the TMDL/WLA/WQBEL process is sexy, but it is critical to understanding the strengths and limits of
the water quality standards process.
52. Id. at 107.
53. TSD, supra note 48. In its 2000 water quality standards regulations, the EPA refers to the TSD
as one of the relevant, current EPA guidance documents applicable to water quality-based permitting
decisions. 2000 TMDL Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43641 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).
54. The TSD lists a variety of different, acceptable means of allocation. TSD, supra note 48, at 69
tbl.4-1. The EPA states that the "most commonly used allocation methods have been equal percent
removal, equal effluent concentrations, and a hybrid method." Id. at 69.
55. Id. at 98.
56. The EPA has stated that "[d]irect use of a WLA as a permit limit creates a significant risk that
the WLA will be enforced incorrectly, since effluent variability and the probability basis for the limit are
not considered specifically." Id. at 96.
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apply various modeling alternatives for calculation of the WLA and
WQBEL. 57
As discussed below, one of the more contentious issues in developing
WQBELs involves the assumptions relating to existing instream water qual-
ity. 58 In many cases, permit writers assume that there are no existing pollut-
ants in the stream; this allows allocation of a full load to the proposed dis-
charger. Use of actual, instream water quality data, however, assures that
the existing discharges are factored into the calculations for a proposed dis-
charge permit. Indeed, use of existing instream water quality data, in itself,
seems to be a form of de facto waste load allocation. Assimilative capacity
of the water body is allocated based on location. Upstream discharges can
have greater authorized discharges than downstream discharges. In many
ways, the TMDL/WLA process is not necessary to ensure attainment of
water quality goals; it may, rather, be necessary to have a more rational
process for deciding how to allocate the assimilative capacity of a water
body between upstream/downstream dischargers, point/nonpoint discharg-
ers, and present/future dischargers.
It is, at least, safe to say that the process of derivation of TMDLs,
WLAs, and their relationship to development of WQBELs is not only con-
fusing, but confused. 59 In its 2000 rulemaking, in which it withdrew a pro-
posal to require "offsets" for new or expanded sources, the EPA made a
truly remarkable admission. The EPA stated:
Subsequent to the proposal, EPA gained additional insight into cur-
rent practices for deriving water quality-based effluent limits for
sources located on impaired waters and discharging the pollutant(s)
for which the waterbody is impaired. The EPA found a wide range
of practices for deriving such limits with respect to both new dis-
chargers and existing dischargers.6°
The EPA observed that it "believes that there is considerable room for im-
provement in establishing water quality-based effluent limits for all dis-
chargers. 61 It is comforting to know that in the year 2000, the EPA is still
57. The EPA states, for example, that the "type of WLA chosen from which to derive the limits is a
matter of case-by-case application, as determined by the permitting authority." Id. at 98.
58. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
59. One is even left questioning whether the TMDLIWLA process is necessary. If water quality
criteria are expressed as ambient concentrations of a given pollutant in the water body itself, then an
effluent limitation that prohibits discharges in excess of that concentration is adequate. No matter how
many dischargers exist, if each is prohibited from discharging in excess of criteria values, then the in-
stream concentrations will not exceed the criteria. In other words, concentrations are not additive. There
are, of course, problems with such an approach. It may impose limits more stringent than necessary to
achieve water quality standards. It ignores the critical problem of pollutants that bioaccumulate. It is not
readily applicable to criteria expressed as other than numerical concentrations. Nonetheless, it suggests
that the TMDI./WLA process is the only means of addressing water quality standards issues.
60. 2000 TMDL Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,640 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40




"gaining insight" into how its own program, in place since the mid-1970s, is
operating.
B. Control Over Nonpoint Sources
The provisions of the CWA that require control over the addition of pol-
62lutants by nonpoint sources are also simple. There, basically, are not any.
The control of pollution from nonpoint sources such as agricultural runoff
has been politically controversial, and throughout the history of the CWA,
Congress has been content to require planning, but no action, to address
pollution from nonpoint sources. 63
There are several provisions of the CWA that require such planning.
Section 208, present in the original 1972 CWA, provides for development
of "areawide waste treatment management plans" that can include "best
management practice[s]" ("BMPs") on nonpoint sources. 64 In 1987, Con-
gress added section 319 that further requires states to develop plans that
include provisions for control of nonpoint sources.65 Congress conspicu-
ously failed to include a mechanism to allow the EPA to act if states fail to
adopt adequate, enforceable plans. Section 303(e) of the CWA also requires
states to develop a "continuing planning process" that can include not only
provisions for implementation of water quality standards by controls on
point sources, but also implementation plans for control of nonpoint
sources.
66
There have been several major developments significant to control of
nonpoint sources. First, the EPA has attempted to harness the point source
program by expanding NPDES requirements for such sources of pollution
as storm water runoff and animal feedlots. 67 Second, the water quality stan-
dards/TMDL process has begun to include consideration of nonpoint
68sources. In Pronsolino v. Nastri, for example, the Ninth Circuit required
development of TMDLs on impaired waters where pollution came exclu-
62. In American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit
rather emphatically stated that, in the CWA, "Congress has chosen not to give the EPA the authority to
regulate nonpoint source pollution." The court used this conclusion to uphold an EPA approval of a
Montana water quality standards provision that exempted "nonpoint" sources from antidegradation
review. Id. at 1198. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
63. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Ch. 4.4 (2d ed. 1994).
64. Clean Water Act § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000).
65. Id. § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2000).
66. Id. § 303(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2000). These section 303(e) plans must, among other things,
incorporate elements of "area-wide waste management plans" developed under section 208. Id.
67. See, e.g., Final Reissuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Storm Water
Multi-Sector General Permit for Industrial Activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,746 (Oct. 30, 2000) (issuance of
general NPDES storm water permit applicable to a group of industrial facilities); National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001) (proposed rule regulating
discharges from concentrated animal feeding operations through the NPDES program). See Concerned
Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (dairy farm is a point
source under the CWA).
68. 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
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sively from nonpoint sources. Third, the EPA has continued to develop a
water quality trading program.69 This program, which presumably would
allow the buying and selling of pollution reductions between point and non-
point sources, could be a major vehicle for implementing controls on non-
point sources in a politically acceptable manner.
In 2000, the EPA adopted a major revision of the water quality stan-
dards/TMDL program that incorporated new requirements for consideration
of nonpoint sources and imposed new requirements on states to adopt some
form of "implementation plan" to achieve controls on nonpoint sources.7 °
This program was extremely controversial. Congress specifically delayed its
implementation, and the Bush Administration specifically withdrew it.
71
The nonpoint source problem remains, without doubt, the most signifi-
cant point of controversy under the CWA. Indeed, the distinct issue of
growth has been largely submerged within the more contentious issue of
nonpoint source controls.
II. CURRENT LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON NEW OR EXPANDED DISCHARGES OF
POLLUTANTS
The express provisions of the CWA contain only limited reference to
the special problems associated with growth and expansion.72 The structure
69. See Water Quality Trading Policy: Issuance of Final Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (Jan. 13, 2003).
70. 2000 TMDL Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
122, 123, 124, 130).
71. See supra note 15.
72. Perhaps the "antidegradation" requirements of the water quality standards program, discussed
below, can be seen as directly addressing the issue of new and expanded dischargers. See infra notes
114-217 and accompanying text. This requirement was not, however, specifically included in the CWA
until 1987, and even then only by reference. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. It is hard to say
that the CWA directly reflects any special concern for the special problems of growth.
This lack of detail in the CWA is in sharp contrast with the Clean Air Act that, through the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-92 (2000), and Non-
Attainment Program, id. §§ 7501-15, has well-established requirements that are triggered by increased
emissions from existing or new sources. The parallels between the issues of non-attainment and PSD
under the Clean Air Act and the issues of "impaired waters" and "antidegradation" under the CWA are
absolutely clear. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1999). Indeed, these issues of attainment and mainte-
nance of environmental quality are inherent in any program that relies on an environmental quality
approach to pollution control. This approach is at the core of the Clean Air Act provisions dealing with
attainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards and the CWA provisions dealing with attainment
of "water quality standards." The Clean Air Act provisions for offsets are thus of clear significance to
developing programs under the CWA.
The differences between the two acts should not, however, be ignored. Non-attainment and PSD
provisions of the Clean Air Act create a "new source review" ("NSR") program that targets controls on
new or modified major stationary sources. Although many significant consequences follow from NSR,
including a requirement of offsets in non-attainment regions, NSR also results in imposition of signifi-
cant technology-based limitations. In the absence of NSR, existing sources largely escape a requirement
for use of technology-based limits. In contrast, the CWA mandates achievement of technology-based
standards by all existing sources. Thus, the most significant control requirements under the CWA have
not been dependent on development of an NSR program. This, as much as any other factor, may explain
the ability to ignore new and expanded source issues under the CWA.
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of the CWA, however, mandates attention to growth issues in connection
with efforts to attain water quality goals and maintain existing water quality.
First, a word about nomenclature. The terms "existing source," "new
source," and "new discharger" currently have specific and highly technical
meanings under the CWA regulatory programs. 3 No existing terms capture
the concept of a discharger that adds new or increased amounts of pollutants
to a water body. In some cases, the EPA refers to "new or expanded dis-
chargers," but this phrase is undefined and used rather casually.74
Without putting too technical a spin on these terms, this Article will re-
fer to "existing dischargers" and "new dischargers" in a rather common
sense way to refer to existing and new sources of pollution on a water body.
Basically, "existing dischargers" will refer to sources of pollutants (both
point and nonpoint sources) that are already on the stream. "Expanded dis-
charges" will refer to an increased discharge of pollutants by these existing
dischargers. "New dischargers" will refer to facilities newly discharging
into a water body.75 The phrase "new or expanded discharges" will also
refer to some addition of pollutants to a water body from either new or ex-
76isting dischargers.
A. Growth and the Attainment of Water Quality Goals: TMDLs
and the Waste Load Allocation Process
1. TMDLs, Waste Load Allocations, and Growth Allowances
The TMDL/WLA process is a central component of whatever scheme
the EPA may currently be said to have for addressing the issue of new and
expanded dischargers. Indeed, the EPA's entire policy on growth and at-
73. As discussed above, a "new source" is one that commences construction after promulgation of
an applicable NSPS. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. An "existing source" includes any facil-
ity that is not a "new source."
For reasons largely related to permit procedural issues, the EPA also created a classification of
"new discharger." A "new discharger" is currently defined as a facility that (1) discharges pollutants, (2)
commenced discharging after April 1979, (3) is not a new source, and (4) has not received an NPDES
permit. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2003). The definition essentially includes facilities that would be new sources
if they were constructed after promulgation of an applicable NSPS. Since the definition excludes facili-
ties that are "new sources," one must, in EPA-speak, refer to "new source/new discharger" to refer to
newly-discharging facilities. To add just a little more confusion, a "new discharger" is also, by defini-
tion, an "existing source."
74. See, e.g., 1998 ANPRM, supra note 10.
75. This classification is similar to one contained in the EPA's ill-fated August 1999 NPDES Pro-
posal in which the EPA proposed to establish or revise certain definitions related to the growth issue. See
1999 NPDES Proposal, supra note 14. The EPA proposed to define a new class of "existing dischargers"
that would generally have included facilities that have been discharging and have received an NPDES
permit. The EPA also defined a new term, "significant expansion," to refer to situations in which a
discharger significantly increased its discharge of pollutants into a water body. The EPA proposed to
revise the term "new discharger" to include newly-discharging facilities that had not previously received
an NPDES permit. Essentially, this classification would include newly-constructed facilities or facilities
that for the first time discharged into a water body. None of these terms would have included nonpoint
sources.
76. In contrast, references to "existing sources" and "new sources" will involve the technical mean-
ing now applicable under the CWA.
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tainment of water quality standards can be said to exist solely in encourag-
ing states to include a "growth allowance" in their waste load allocation.
Under this policy, the EPA encourages states to reserve some portion of the
allowable load or discharge into a stream segment to account for both future
sources and future expansion by existing sources.
There are a number of problems with the EPA's policy on growth al-
lowances. First, it is hard to say that it really exists. 7 The only reference to
such a policy in the EPA's existing regulations is contained in the EPA's
definitions of "wasteload allocation" and "load allocation." In the existing
water quality management regulations, a wasteload allocation is defined as
"[t]he portion of a receiving water's loading capacity that is allocated to one
of its existing or future point sources of pollution.' '78 Similarly, a "load allo-
cation" is defined as the "portion of a receiving water's loading capacity
that is attributed either to one of its existing or future nonpoint sources of
pollution or to natural background sources., 79 That appears to be it. There
are no references to growth allowances or any other requirements relating to
future loadings in any other part of the EPA's water quality management or
water quality standards regulations.
Prior to the late 1990s, it is difficult to find any reference to any policy
on growth allowances in EPA guidance. None of the EPA's major guidance
documents, such as the Water Quality Standards Handbook,80 Guidance for
Water Quality-Based Decisions: The TMDL Process,81 or the Technical
Support Document for Water Quality-Based Toxics Control,82 appears to
address the issue of growth or growth allowances in any detail, if at all.
Perhaps the first significant public discussion of growth allowances ap-
pears in the EPA's 1999 TMDL proposal and final 2000 regulation. In the
proposal, the EPA expressly proposed to require the inclusion of "an allow-
ance for future loading ... account[s] for reasonably foreseeable increases
in pollutant loads. 83 But, in fact, there was little discussion. In its proposal,
the EPA's preamble contains a single paragraph on this issue that restates
but does not explain the significance of the requirement. 84 The EPA subse-
77. Professor Houck's review of existing TMDLs identified only a limited number of explicit
"growth allowances." See HOUCK, supra note 9, at app.C. In 1998, the EPA published the REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD PROGRAM, EPA 100-R-
98-006 (July 1998). In describing the existing program, the report stated that "an allocation for future
growth is not required ...." Id. at 35. The report went on to recommend that "States should always
consider including future growth in allocations, and document their decisions. The documentation should
clearly explain to sources the implications of the growth allocation decision, especially if there is no
allocation for growth." Id.
78. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h) (2003) (emphasis added).
79. Id. § 130.2(g) (emphasis added).
80. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38.
81. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL
PROCESS, EPA 440/4-91-001 (Apr. 1991).
82. TSD, supra note 48.
83. 1999 TMDL Proposal, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,012, 46,032 (proposed Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 130) (proposing 40 C.F.R. § 130.33(b)(9)).
84. In its discussion of this proposal, the EPA noted that a state may "choose to completely allocate
the pollutant loading for a waterbody and thus leave no loading for future growth." Id. at 46,032. The
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quently promulgated the requirement as part of its 2000 TMDL regulation. 85
In the brief discussion in the preamble, the EPA stated that it "believes ac-
counting for any such potential increases is a necessary step in setting loads
at a level necessary to implement standards and accordingly is authorized by
§ 303(d)(1)(c). ' '86 Upon withdrawal of this regulation, we are back to the
definitions of waste load allocation and load allocation as the basis for any
policy of growth allowances. 87 In neither its proposal nor its final promulga-
tion, however, did the EPA discuss the relationship between a new, express
requirement for growth allowances and its past TMDL policy.
Even assuming that there is some express policy of encouraging growth
allowances, there are numerous problems associated with implementing
such a policy. How much of an available load should one reserve (and for
whom)? Reservation of loads for future growth presumably reduces the load
available to existing sources. In other words, existing sources pay more now
to allow for some uncertain future growth. The EPA has stated that states
may choose to ignore future growth and allocate the entire available load to
existing sources. If, however, no allocation for future growth is made and
future sources are required to "purchase" loads from existing sources
through some offset program, the additional costs associated with growth
are borne by the new or expanding discharger. The allocation of compliance
costs between existing and new dischargers is an interesting issue that raises
any number of difficult efficiency and equity questions. It is an issue that
the EPA has not yet effectively addressed.88
Aside from the questions of fairness that are inherent in the process, a
growth allowance simply buys time. At some point the allowance is used
up. At that point, what is the fate of new or expanded sources? We are either
back to an iterative process of revised WLAs in which the state mandates
further reductions from existing sources, or new or expanded dischargers
must inevitably secure some form of offset from existing sources.
2. The Prohibition on New Source Permitting
If the issue of growth allowances and impaired waters is ambiguous, the
EPA's policy for implementation is even more confused. In some respects,
the EPA's policy on control of new sources is clear and dramatic. Under 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(i), first promulgated in 1983, no permit may be issued to "a
new source or a new discharger" if its construction or operation will "cause
EPA did not discuss the implications for growth if a state did allocate all loading to existing sources.
85. The 2000 TMDL Regulation added a new 40 C.F.R. § 130.32(b)(10) that required states to
include as a TMDL element an "allowance for future growth to account for reasonably foreseeable
increases in pollutant loads." 2000 TMDL Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,624 (July 13, 2000) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).
86. Id.
87. Following the 2003 withdrawal of this regulation, we are back to the definitions of wasteload
allocation and load allocation as the basis for any policy of growth allowances. See 2003 Withdrawal, 68
Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).
88. See infra notes 108-98 and accompanying text.
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or contribute to the violation of water quality standards." 89 The regulation
expressly authorizes a new discharge into a water segment not meeting wa-
ter quality standards if a load allocation for the pollutant to be discharged
has been performed and (1) there are sufficient remaining load allocations to
allow for the discharge, or (2) existing dischargers are "subject to compli-
ance schedules designed to bring the segment into compliance with applica-
ble water quality standards." 90
On its face, this regulation would seem to prohibit the issuance of any
NPDES permit to a new source of pollutants into waters not meeting water
quality standards unless it could take advantage of an available, unused
waste load allocation. 9' Since there are many impaired waters and few waste
load allocations, one might think that this provision would have stopped
new source growth in its tracks.
Think again. It is difficult to find a single case or administrative deci-
sion in which an NPDES permit was denied to a new source because of this
regulation. Indeed, prior to the late 1990s, it is hard to find any reference to
this provision at all. The reasons are simple. First, neglect. For many years,
the EPA simply ignored water quality standards issues in its effort to im-
pose technology-based limits. No attention was given to water quality stan-
dards; no attention was given to new source prohibitions.
Second, it appears that the EPA has, in the past, construed this provision
to allow issuance of permits in the absence of applicable TMDLs or waste
load allocations. Indeed, in 1999, the EPA issued a proposal that specifi-
cally would have established new "offset" requirements for new or ex-
panded discharges that would apply in the absence of approved TMDLs.92
This certainly seemed to imply that such discharges were authorized in the
absence of a TMDL, and some commentators criticized the proposal on this
ground.93 When the EPA withdrew this proposal in 2003, the EPA seemed
to acknowledge, with an air of surprise, that its long-established require-
ment in section 122.4(i) might already give it authority to address new dis-
chargers even in the absence of an approved TMDL.
In 2003, however, several court decisions seemed to support a construc-
tion that section 122.4(i) prohibits new source permitting in the absence of
approved TMDLs.94 In San Francisco Baykeeper v. Browner,95 for example,
89. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2003).
90. Id.
91. It is important to note that section 122.4(i) addresses "new sources" and "new dischargers;" it
does not, on its face, apply to expansion by existing sources. Thus, the relationship between expansion
by existing dischargers and the EPA's policy on attainment of water quality standards is even more
obscure.
92. 1999 NPDES Proposal, supra note 14.
93. The EPA subsequently noted that some commentators argued that this provision would undercut
a construction of section 122.4(i) as flatly prohibiting the issuance of permits to new sources or new
dischargers on impaired waters. See 2000 TMDL Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,640 (July 13,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).
94. In a somewhat ambiguous 1996 decision, the court in Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp.




a citizen suit to compel the EPA to take certain actions to implement the
water quality standards program, the court wrote:
Under the regulations to the CWA, there can be no "new source" or
"new discharger," if the discharge will contribute to a violation of
water quality standards. Thus, there cannot be a new source or a
new discharger if the waterbody is a WQLS impaired waterway
unless the state completes a TMDL for that WQLS beforehand.96
In Friends of Wild Swan v. EPA,97 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a district court order that not only set a deadline for establish-
ment of TMDLs for Montana waters but also prohibited the issuance of new
discharge permits until Montana developed its TMDLs. In upholding this
prohibition, the Ninth Circuit noted the EPA's argument that the prohibition
"interferes with the regulatory scheme, which does not require a complete
ban on discharges in violation of state water quality standards. 98 The Ninth
Circuit was unimpressed, writing:
The district court's order, however, does not impose a complete ban
but only restricts the issuance of new permits or increased dis-
charges for WQLSs, which are already in violation of state water
quality standard. This comports with the regulatory requirement
precluding issuance of new permits for new sources that will cause
or contribute to a violation of water quality standards.99
In support of its position, the EPA apparently cited to Arkansas v. Okla-
homa,1°° in which the Supreme Court rejected the position that the CWA
flatly prohibits the permitting of new sources on impaired waters. The case,
as discussed below, is of little direct relevance to the issue of CWA re-
quirements for TMDLs for discharges on impaired waters.' 0 1
EPA shall (or ensure that the State shall) comply with 40 CFR § 122.4(i) regarding the prohi-
bition on new sources or new dischargers that will cause or contribute to a violation of water
quality standards, requiring new permitees or new dischargers to demonstrate that there are
sufficient load allocations to allow for the discharge and requiring that the existing discharg-
ers into that segment are subject to compliance schedules designed to bring the WQLS into
compliance with applicable water quality standards.
Id. at 874.
95. 147 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
96. Id. at 995 (citation omitted).
97. 74 Fed. Appx. 718, 2003 WL 21751849 (9th Cir. (Mont.) July 25, 2003).
98. Id. at 723-24.
99. Id. at 724.
100. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
101. Among other things, the case dealt with "antidegradation" requirements; the Supreme Court
never mentioned, let alone discussed, the role of TMDLs and section 122.4(i). Second, the case was
based on aspects of a state's water quality requirements for high quality waters that may not be an aspect
of federally-mandated minimum requirements. Third, the Supreme Court's opinion was based on a
decision of the EPA's Chief Judicial Officer that was, arguably, quite flawed. See infra notes 150-71 and
accompanying text.
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3. TMDLs, Waste Load Allocations, and Offsets
In 1999, the EPA, under the Clinton Administration, proposed far-
reaching changes to the water quality standards program. °2 Among those
changes was a proposal to revise "antidegradation" requirements to estab-
lish an "offset" program for impaired waters. 0 3 The proposal, which would
have applied only if there were no EPA-approved TMDLs in place, would
have required a newly-defined class of "new dischargers" and a newly-
defined class of "existing dischargers" that "significantly expand" to obtain
offsets for their new discharges of pollutants of concern. 104 Each new pound
of discharge would need to be offset by a reduction of one and one-half
pounds of discharge from existing point or nonpoint sources. 0 5 This pro-
posal would have allowed growth while still assuring "reasonable further
progress" towards attainment of water quality goals."°6 In 2000, the same
Clinton Administration abandoned the proposal. 1
07
This offset proposal and the EPA's rationale for abandoning it raise im-
portant questions about growth and attainment of water quality standards. 0 8
First, it is remarkable that the proposal was limited to streams for which
there were no approved TMDLs. The proposal, together with other pro-
posed revisions to the TMDL program, would apparently rely exclusively
on "growth allowances" to deal with new and expanded sources. It would be
in the WLA process that a state would reserve loads sufficient to allow new
growth. Reductions from existing sources necessary to achieve water qual-
ity standards would presumably be mandated by the state, not purchased by
new sources.
As discussed above, however, reliance on growth allowances is prob-
lematic at best. In many ways, the only difference between an offset and a
growth allowance is that with a growth allowance, the state mandates reduc-
tions from existing sources to accommodate growth; with offsets, the costs
are borne by the new or expanded discharger who must presumably pur-
chase the right to discharge from existing sources. The proposal is even
more problematic since it encouraged but did not mandate a growth allow-
ance. In other words, states were free to allocate all available loads to exist-
102. 1999 NPDES Proposal, supra note 14.
103. 2000 TMDL Regulation, supra note 14.
104. Id. at 43,638-40.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 43,638.
107. Id.
108. One question is why the EPA placed the offset requirement in its antidegradation policy. As
discussed below, the antidegradation policy establishes requirements that limit the degradation of exist-
ing water quality and loss of existing uses. It does not require further improvement of existing water
quality. The EPA's offset proposal should logically have been placed with section 122.4(i) or in the
EPA's permit regulations in section 122.44. Placement of this requirement in the antidegradation re-
quirements further confuses an already incoherent relationship between attainment and antidegradation.
See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
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ing sources. The efficiency and fairness implications of this proposal de-
serve extended discussion.
Another fascinating aspect of the "offset" proposal was the rationale
advanced by the EPA for abandoning it.1 9 Most of the significant criticisms
of the proposal related to the practical problems of implementing an en-
forceable program. The EPA largely ignored these concerns. Rather, in its
explanation for why it was dropping the proposal, the EPA essentially stated
that it was unnecessary. 110 The EPA suddenly awakened to the existence of
regulatory requirements that had been in place for twenty years and claimed
that the existing program could assure attainment. The EPA cited to 40
C.F.R. § 122.44(d) that requires permits to contain conditions necessary to
comply with water quality standards. The EPA discovered section 122.4(i)
that prohibits, in some way, new discharges. The EPA stated that the offset
proposal was unnecessary:
For those dischargers who would have been subject to the offset re-
quirement, consistent implementation of §§ 122.44(d)(1)(vii) and
122.4(i) following existing EPA guidance would result in permits, if
issued, containing limits and conditions for the pollutant(s) of con-
cern that derive from and comply with applicable water quality
standards. These limits and conditions are water quality-based ef-
fluent limits and, if derived in compliance with existing regulations,
ensure that the discharge will not cause or contribute to a violation
of water quality standards."'
Dr. Pangloss is the new Administrator of the EPA. We have been living in
the best of all possible worlds for all this time.
But the rationale gets better. According to the EPA, the primary change
to past practice that needs to be implemented to address the problem of new
or expanded dischargers is the use of actual ambient concentrations in cal-
culating a WQBEL.112 The use of actual ambient concentrations assures that
a permit limit takes into account existing point and nonpoint sources. The
EPA states that "[f]ailure to use a background value would result in evaluat-
ing the discharge to the nonattained water as if the water were actually at-
taining its water quality standards."' 13 Use of background data apparently
cures all and makes offsets unnecessary.
This argument lies somewhere between disingenuous and absurd. Of
course permit writers need to consider actual ambient concentrations in as-
sessing requirements for a new or expanded discharge. But that issue is
simply irrelevant to the underlying question of what a permit writer is to do
109. 2000 TMDL Regulation, supra note 14, at 43,640-41.
110. Id.
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when the existing conditions violate water quality standards. That is the
issue addressed by offsets, and the EPA, in rejecting its own offset proposal,
never confronts the reality that, on impaired waters, either new or expanded
discharges must be prohibited or somebody has to reduce its existing dis-
charge. There are many compelling practical problems with an offset re-
quirement, but the EPA simply chose not to confront these problems. The
EPA's actions leave the issue of offsets for another day.
B. Growth and Maintenance of Water Quality:
The Antidegradation Provision
The "antidegradation" provisions of the water quality standards pro-
gram contain perhaps the most significant elements that directly address the
issues of growth by new or expanded dischargers.' 14 Under EPA's regula-
tions, all states are required to adopt a provision that limits the degradation
of existing water uses or water quality, and this "antidegradation" provision
inherently acts, if it acts at all, to impose limits on the ability of new or ex-
panded point sources to introduce new pollutants into a water body." 5 As
the EPA has stated, however, "the antidegradation policy is significantly
underused as a tool to attain and maintain water quality and plan for and
channel important economic and social development that can impact water
quality."' 16
114. The antidegradation provision is, under the EPA's regulations, a required part of a state's water
quality standards. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.6(d), 131.12. The EPA has stated:
Antidegradation was originally based on the spirit, intent, and goals of the Act, especially the
clause ". . . restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters" (101(a)) and the provision of 303(a) that made water quality standards under
prior law the "starting point" for CWA water quality requirements.
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-1.
In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. W. Va. 2003),
the court upheld an antidegradation provision that exempted existing sources from review. The court
cited the EPA's Water Quality Standards Handbook that states that "new discharges or expansion of
existing facilities would presumably lower water quality and would not be permissible unless the State
conducts [tier 2 review]." WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-7. The hand-
book makes no reference to the application of the antidegradation policy to potential degradation from
existing permitted discharges.
115. The EPA has been inconsistent in its statements regarding the application of the antidegradation
provisions to "unregulated" activity such as nonpoint sources. In current guidance published as part of its
Water Quality Standards Handbook, the EPA states that "[nionpoint source activities are not exempt
from the provisions of the antidegradation policy." WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra
note 38, app.G at 6. In its 1998 ANPRM, the EPA states that "application of antidegradation require-
ments to activities that are otherwise unregulated under State, Tribal, and federal water law is not re-
quired by the federal water quality standards regulation." 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,780
(proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). In American Wildlands v. Browner, 260
F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit rejected challenges to the EPA's approval of a
Montana antidegradation provision that excluded nonpoint sources. The court stated that, given the
absence of authority to regulate nonpoint sources, the EPA's position was a "permissible construction"
of the Act. Id. at 1198. Given the EPA's inconsistent approach to this issue and failure to adopt a formal
regulatory position, it is questionable whether the EPA's interpretation is entitled to deference.
116. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,780 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131).
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The antidegradation provision is of certain provenance but uncertain
meaning. First announced in 1966 by the Department of the Interior, the
policy was later adopted by the EPA as a requirement of the water quality
standards program under the 1972 CWA."17 In the 1987 amendments to the
CWA, Congress revised section 303(d)(4)(B) to incorporate an antidegrada-
tion requirement for waters that "equal or exceed" the quality necessary to
support designated uses."
8
The antidegradation policy establishes a confusing set of limits on deg-
radation of water quality.l"9 It is routinely characterized as establishing sev-
eral "tiers" or classes of waters with varying limitations on the ability of
new or expanded dischargers to degrade the quality of water in that tier.1
2
0
117. See id. at 36,779; N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the
Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643 (1977); Michael Sny-
der, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective Action, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
890 (1975).
The policy, as defined in 1968 by Secretary of the Interior Udall, provided:
Waters whose existing quality is better than the established standards as of the date on which
such standards become effective will be maintained at their existing high quality. These and
other waters of a State will not be lowered in water quality unless and until it has been af-
firmatively demonstrated to the State water pollution control agency and the Department of
the Interior that such change is justifiable as a result of necessary economic or social devel-
opment and will not interfere with or become injurious to any assigned uses made of, or pres-
ently possible in, such waters. This will require that any industrial, public or private project or
development which would constitute a new source of pollution or an increased source of pol-
lution to high quality waters will be required, as part of the initial project design, to provide
the highest and best degree of waste treatment available under existing technology, and, since
these are also Federal standards, these waste treatment requirements will be developed coop-
eratively.
1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,779.
118. This section provides:
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the quality of such waters equals or ex-
ceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use for such waters or otherwise required by
applicable water quality standards, any effluent limitation based on a total maximum daily
load or other waste load allocation established under this section, or any water quality stan-
dard established under this section, or any other permitting standard may be revised only if
such revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy established under
this section.
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000).
119. A number of EPA documents are of particular relevance in describing the EPA's policy on
antidegradation. The Water Quality Standards Handbook contains an extended discussion on antidegra-
dation in Chapter 4 and, in Appendix G, contains a separate document entitled "Questions and Answers
on: Antidegradation." WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38. These presumably
represent current statements of EPA policy. Its 1998 ANPRM also contains a discussion of the EPA's
policies on antidegradation. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,742.
In addition, EPA has published "Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes." Final
Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,366 (Mar. 23, 1995) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 131, 132) [hereinafter Great Lakes Guidance]. This guidance imple-
ments section 118(c)(2) of the CWA (as amended by the Great Lakes Critical Programs Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-596, 104 Stat 3000 (1990)), which required the EPA to publish proposed and final water
quality guidance on minimum water quality standards, antidegradation policies, and implementation
procedures for the Great Lakes System. The Great Lakes Guidance contains thoughtful, detailed discus-
sions of major issues affecting the antidegradation requirements of the CWA. By its own terms, the
actual provisions of the Great Lakes Guidance are designed to deal with the unique problems of water
quality in the Great Lakes. See Great Lakes Guidance, 60 Fed. Reg. at 15,369. Nonetheless, the EPA and
the courts have cited to the Great Lakes Guidance in describing existing EPA policies.
120. See, e.g., WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-I.
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"Tier 1" waters essentially include all waters with water quality at or
below "fishable/swimmable" levels,12' and the policy requires that "existing
uses" in these waters be maintained. 22 In other words, the focus of Tier I
requirements is the prevention of the loss of any existing use of water by the
addition of new pollutants. Under EPA's regulations, an "existing use" is
one that "actually existed" on or after November 28, 1975.123 The EPA
states that this requirement establishes "the absolute floor of water quality in
all waters of the United States."'' 24 It applies a "minimum level of protection
to all waters."'' 25 The scope of protection afforded to existing uses is unclear
but potentially quite broad.
26
"Tier 2" waters are those waters whose water quality exceeds fish-
able/swimmable levels. Tier 2 waters are essentially "high quality" wa-
ters. 127 The antidegradation provision prohibits the degradation of water
quality in Tier 2 waters unless the state has gone through a public process
and makes a determination that allowing lower water quality is "necessary
to accommodate important economic or social development.' 28 Following
this process, a state may elect to allow degradation of Tier 2 waters but only
if it has otherwise assured that the achievement of "the highest statutory and
regulatory requirements for all new and existing point sources and all cost-
effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint source
control.' 29 Additionally, degradation may not be allowed in Tier 2 waters if
it will result in the loss of an existing use.'
30
121. Id.
122. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (2003). Independent of the antidegradation provision, 40 C.F.R. §
131.10(h)(1) (2003) prohibits the loss of an existing use.
123. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(e) (2003). This provision defines "existing uses" as "those uses actually
attained in the water body on or after November 28, 1975, whether or not they are included in the water
quality standards." Id.
124. See WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-1.
125. Id. at 4-2.
126. Under the EPA's antidegradation policy, existing uses must be protected even if not a part of the
designated use. In its Water Quality Standards Handbook, the EPA states that even "subcategories" of
fishable/swimmable water must be protected from loss. The EPA states:
The aquatic protection use is a broad category requiring further explanation. Non-aberrational
resident species must be protected, even if not prevalent in number or importance. Water
quality should be such that it results in no mortality and no significant growth or reproductive
impairment of resident species. Any lowering of water quality below this full level of protec-
tion is not allowed.
Id. at 4-5.
Interpreted this broadly, the Tier I protections could significantly affect the ability of new or
expanded dischargers to operate. Tier I protections, however, contain no mandatory public participation
or documentation requirements, and it appears that its flat prohibition on loss of an existing use has not
been a major component of the antidegradation process.
The EPA's 1998 ANPRM contains an extended discussion of the possible approaches both to
the designation and maintenance of existing uses. See 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,751-54,
36,781-82 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
127. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-1.





"Tier 3" waters are high quality waters that "constitute an outstanding
National resource. ' 1 Hence, the term "outstanding national resources wa-
ters" ("ONRWs"). 132 The regulation essentially prohibits any degradation of
water quality in ONRWs.133 One dirty little secret of the water quality stan-
dards program is that the EPA may not have authority to require states to
designate waters as Tier 3 ONRWs. 134 Thus, the decision to designate and
maintain Tier 3 protection is presumably a matter of state discretion. It is an
"encouraged," but apparently not required, aspect of the antidegradation
policy. 135
These provisions are not entirely coherent. Degradation, but not loss of
existing uses, is allowed in lower quality Tier 1 waters; degradation is pro-
hibited in high quality Tier 2 waters unless economically or socially justi-
fied. No public process of review is required for degradation of Tier 1 wa-
ters; an elaborate public process is required prior to authorizing degradation
of Tier 2 waters. Go figure.
36
Coherent or not, the antidegradation requirements establish potentially
significant constraints on new or expanded discharges. The significance of
these constraints hinge on a number of issues.
1. What Constitutes a Tier 2 High Quality Water?
Given its structure, much of the force of the antidegradation require-
ments follows from the classification of a stream segment. New or ex-
panded dischargers into a Tier 1 water segment face only limited constraints
under the antidegradation policy; new or expanded dischargers into Tier 2
waters, at least theoretically, should be subject to public review, public jus-
131. Id. § 131.12(a)(3) (2003).
132. The regulation describes ONRWs as "waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges
and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance." Id.
133. In 1983, the EPA revised this provision to allow limited and temporary degradation of ONRWs.
See 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,402-03 (Nov. 8, 1983).
134. At least as early as 1979, the EPA's Office of General Counsel ("OGC") had indicated doubts
about the EPA's authority to require designation of ONRWs. See Memorandum from James A. Rogers,
Associate General Counsel, to Kenneth M. Mackenthum (Aug. 15, 1979). In a 1989 memorandum, the
OGC continued to state that requiring states to adopt ONRWs would be "legally risky." The memo
stated:
In summary neither the 1983 rulemaking nor the subsequent guidance indicates to the
public (or to OGC) that EPA intended the ONRW designation to be a mandatory one. Nor
does the regulation clearly indicate the criteria for designation such that we could reliably de-
fend a disapproval of a non-designation against a charge that we were being arbitrary and ca-
pricious. Since EPA is authorized to promulgate only where we find that a state standard does
not meet the requirements of the act or that a new or revised standard is necessary to meet the
requirements of the act, I believe that, absent regulatory change, EPA designation of an
ONRW where a state failed to act would still be quite risky.
Memorandum from Catherine A. Winer, Attorney, EPA Water Division, to William Diamond, Director,
EPA Criteria and Standards Division (Mar. 25, 1989).
135. This is not to say that the EPA has not imposed requirements on states that have designated
waters as Tier III. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 23,004 (Apr. 28, 1997) (stating that the EPA disapproved as
inadequate Idaho limitations applicable to Tier III waters; federal provisions proposed).
136. See infra Section [B.C. for a discussion of alternatives to the existing antidegradation provi-
sions.
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tification, and a state requirement to employ nonpoint source controls. What
a difference a classification makes.
Unfortunately, the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in
many cases, be more metaphysical than biological. The antidegradation
provision contemplates, for example, some class of waters that meet but do
not exceed fishable/swimmable levels. 37 Further, a water segment may
meet fishable/swimmable criteria for some pollutants but not for others.
Under EPA guidance, a water body may be designated Tier 2 on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis, and therefore Tier 2 for some pollutants but not others.'
38
Alternatively, the EPA allows states to make the determination on a "water
body-by-water body" basis based on an assessment of a variety of indicators
of water quality.139 This is a "holistic approach" that presumably relies on
the state's gestalt of the water body.' 4
The implications of the use of a "pollutant-by-pollutant" or "water
body-by-water body" approach are quite significant. Under a "pollutant-by-
pollutant" approach, a stream could presumably be treated as a Tier 2 high
quality water even though the presence of some pollutants at levels exceed-
ing criteria values limited its actual, observable use. Under the "water body-
by-water body" approach, in contrast, a stream could be designated as Tier
1 even if its ambient pollutant concentrations were far better than the appli-
cable criteria for a large number of pollutants. 141 The EPA has stated that
"EPA's current thinking is that neither approach is clearly superior and that
137. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board, 660 S.W.2d
776 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), the court held that stringent Tier 2 review provisions did not apply because
the "waters of the river now meet but do not exceed the levels set out in the criteria for each assigned
use." Id. at 783. Since the Tennessee antidegradation provisions applied only to water whose quality is
better than existing standards, the provision did not apply in this case. Id.
138. The EPA has stated:
All parameters do not need to be better quality than the State's ambient criteria for the water
to be deemed a "high-quality water." EPA believes that it is best to apply antidegradation on
a parameter-by-parameter basis. Otherwise, there is potential for a large number of waters not
to receive antidegradation protection ....
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-7.
139. The EPA describes the "pollutant-by-pollutant" options as follows:
Existing approaches for identifying high quality waters fall into two basic categories: (1) pol-
lutant-by-pollutant approaches, and (2) water body-by-water body approaches. States and
Tribes following the first approach determine whether water quality is better than applicable
criteria for specific pollutants that would be affected by the proposed activity. Thus, available
assimilative capacity for any given pollutant is always subject to tier 2 protection, regardless
of whether the criteria for other pollutants are satisfied. Such determinations are made at the
time of the antidegradation review (i.e., as activities that may degrade water quality are pro-
posed).
1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,782 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131).
140. The EPA has stated that the "water body-by-water body" approach "allows for a weighted
assessment of chemical, physical, biological, and other information (e.g., unique ecological or scenic
attributes)." Id. at 36,783.
141. Adding to the confusion, the EPA has stated that a "water body-by-water body" approach is
generally only relevant to classification of a water body as Tier 2. Once the water body has been classi-
fied, the EPA states that a "pollutant-by-pollutant" approach should be followed in determining whether
any individual discharge will cause "significant degradation." Id. See supra notes 143-84 for a discus-
sion of the significance of "significance."
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either, when properly implemented, is acceptable."'142 The EPA has, how-
ever, given limited guidance on "proper implementation."
2. What Constitutes Degradation of High Quality Waters for Purposes
of Antidegradation Review?
New or expanded dischargers into Tier 2 waters are subject to review
and possible limitation if their discharges will "degrade" existing water
quality.143 No "degradation" means no antidegradation constraints. Thus,
the definition of degradation is critical to the scope and stringency of the
antidegradation provision.144
The significance of a finding of "degradation" under the EPA's antide-
gradation policy needs emphasis. A determination that a facility will cause
"degradation" of a Tier 2 water is the "trigger" that launches antidegrada-
tion review. It does not, in itself, provide that a discharge is prohibited; it
142. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,782.
143. In general, Tier 2 antidegradation review is triggered by a finding of "degradation," and courts
have not been receptive to state antidegradation provisions that excluded classes of discharges from
application of Tier 2 review for reasons other than their impact on water quality. In Ohio Valley Envi-
ronmental Coalition v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. W. Va. 2003), for example, the court re-
viewed numerous challenges to the EPA's approval of West Virginia antidegradation provisions that
would have exempted certain types of discharges from Tier 2 review. Among other things:
" The court rejected West Virginia provisions that would have exempted certain ex-
isting municipal sewage treatment plants from antidegradation review if, notwith-
standing their expansion, there were a "net decrease in the overall pollutant load-
ing." The court construed this provision to exempt the facility from antidegrada-
tion review if it increased the discharge of one pollutant as long as it decreased its
discharge of a different pollutant. The court held that the EPA's approval of this
provision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 752-57.
* The court, on the record before it, also rejected the EPA's approval of a provision
that would exempt individual discharges, otherwise subject to a general permit,
from specific antidegradation review. Id. at 757-62.
" The court rejected the EPA's approval of a provision that would have allowed the
Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection from au-
thorizing case-by-case exemptions from Tier 2 antidegradation review. Since the
provision did not require EPA review and approval of such an exemption, the
court rejected the EPA's position that this exemption simply constituted an exer-
cise of the state's authority to revise its antidegradation requirements. Id. at 763-
65.
" The court rejected the EPA's approval of a provision that stated that Tier 2 review
"generally" applied to waters exceeding the minimal quality necessary to support
fishable/swimmable uses. The court was unable to find a rationale in the English
language for the EPA's position that the word "generally" meant "always." Id. at
765-66.
144. In Ex parte Fowl River Protective Ass'n v. Board of Water & Sewer Commissioners of Mobile,
572 So. 2d 446 (Ala. 1990), the Alabama Supreme Court rejected an agency interpretation of the Ala-
bama antidegradation provision that apparently would have applied antidegradation requirements only to
waters with quality better than the public drinking water supply. Id. This would have the effect of essen-
tially avoiding application of the antidegradation provisions to any state waters. Notwithstanding what
the agency had actually said, the agency argued to the court that, in fact, it intended only to limit Tier 2
review to waters with quality better than required for a public drinking water supply. Id. The court re-
jected this interpretation as well, since, among other things, this was not the basis for the agency's ac-
tion. Id. Even this alternative argument by the state agency clearly violates the federal policy that re-
quires Tier 2 review for waters that exceed "fishable/swimmable," not public drinking water, standards.
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does not, in itself, establish a substantive standard of control. Those ques-
tions are answered in the context of the antidegradation review process that
should involve an assessment of, among other things, whether the proposed
discharge is justified by "important" economic and social factors.'
4
F
The meaning of degradation in this context is not obvious. 146 In some
sense, any addition of any new pollutant to a water body degrades existing
quality. A focus on such technical or hypothetical degradation would essen-
tially subject all new or expanded sources to antidegradation review. Alter-
natively, degradation might refer to discharges that result in detectable or
calculable increases in pollutant concentrations. Such a definition would
narrow the scope of review but potentially allow cumulative, small in-
creases of pollutants, none of which is subject to review. Lastly, degrada-
tion, for purposes of antidegradation review, could be limited to some class
of "significant" increases in pollutants. This would focus the costs and con-
straints of antidegradation review on the larger and more significant
sources.
EPA's antidegradation regulation itself does not define what constitutes
degradation of water quality. Although not stated in its regulation, the EPA
apparently allows states to limit Tier 2 review to activities that result in
"significant" degradation. The EPA, in its 1998 ANPRM, stated that it has
approved state antidegradation provisions that limit review to "significant"
degradation.147 Not only does the EPA allow such a limitation, the ANPRM
goes on to state that "[a]pplying antidegradation requirements only to activi-
ties that will result in significant degradation is a useful approach that al-
lows States and Tribes to focus limited resources where they may result in
the greatest environmental protection."'
148
The EPA has not fully explained the legal basis for this interpretation of
its antidegradation provision. In one case, the EPA took the position that
exempting non-significant or "de minimis" discharges from antidegradation
review was justified under general administrative law principles that allow
agencies to establish de minimis exceptions to otherwise applicable legal
requirements. 49 One might think, given the history and significance of the
antidegradation program, that a justification for substantially limiting its
scope would warrant more assessment.
Case law on the scope of antidegradation review is confused. The dis-
pute culminating in the Supreme Court opinion in Arkansas v. Oklahoma
50
is interesting and perhaps instructive on this issue. The dispute involved the
145. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
146. The proposed Great Lakes Guidance has perhaps the most extended discussion that the EPA has
published regarding the various ways in which to characterize or define degradation. See Proposed Water
Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802, 20,886-88 (Apr. 16, 1993).
147. Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,783 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
148. Id.
149. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 767-68 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
150. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
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issuance by the EPA of an NPDES permit to a facility in Arkansas. The
discharge by the Arkansas facility would potentially affect a river in Okla-
homa that had been designated as a "scenic" river, and under Oklahoma
water quality standards, "no degradation" of such a river was allowed. An
aspect of the dispute involved whether the discharge would violate this pro-
vision. It is important to distinguish two different issues raised by these
facts. First, there is the question of whether the provision is applicable at all;
presumably the provision applies only if there is a finding that a discharge
might cause "degradation." This is the issue that is of greatest relevance to
understanding the EPA's national antidegradation policy. Remember, no
"degradation," no review. Second, there is the issue of whether the Okla-
homa provision requires prohibition of any discharge once there is a finding
that a discharge might cause degradation. The Oklahoma regulation appar-
ently treated the river as a Tier 3 ONRW for which no degradation could be
allowed. An issue on the application of the Tier 3 prohibition would be in-
teresting, but of limited significance, if the ONRW classification is not
mandated by federal law. These issues were confused in the subsequent
proceedings.
The dispute arose in the context of a challenge to the EPA's issuance of
the permit. Following an evidentiary hearing before an EPA Administrative
Law Judge ("AU"), the ALJ authorized the permit and held that, with re-
spect to interstate waters, a discharge was prohibited only if it would have
"undue impact" on an adjacent state's waters.
On appeal to EPA's Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"), the Chief
Judicial Officer (CJO) rejected this legal standard and made several interest-
ing rulings. 51 First, the CJO wrote that state water quality standards must be
strictly enforced; no lesser standard of "undue impact" applied because of
the interstate effect of the discharge. 52 Second, regarding compliance with
Oklahoma's antidegradation provision, the CJO wrote:
Nonetheless, mere theoretical impairment of Oklahoma's water
quality standards-i.e., an infinitesimal impairment predicted
through modeling but not expected to be actually detectable or
measurable-should not by itself block the issuance of the permit.
In this case, the permit should be upheld if the record shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the authorized discharges would
not cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality
standards.1
53
Finally, the CJO went on to state that a standard of "detectable or meas-
urable" violation did not justify a conclusion that only "significant" changes
151. In re City of Fayetteville, 2 E.A.D. 594 (1988).
152. Id. at 600.
153. Id. at 601.
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to water quality constitute degradation. 54 Rather, the CJO wrote that "[t]he
showing that must be made here implies neither a reasonableness standard
nor a significance test, but instead is directed at the quantity and quality of
the evidence relating to whether a violation would occur."
1 55
It is hard to know exactly what to make of the CJO's opinion. First, the
opinion seems limited to the issue of whether Oklahoma's antidegradation
provision prohibited the issuance of a permit to a new source; it did not di-
rectly address the issue of the standard for triggering "antidegradation re-
view." In the context of the prohibition, the opinion seems to clearly imply
that "degradation" does not arise merely because the addition of some new
pollutants has a theoretical effect on water quality. Additionally, it seem-
ingly rejects the view that degradation exists only when there is some "sig-
nificant," as opposed to de minimis, impact.
Although the CJO may be correct in his interpretation of "degradation"
in this context, the analysis in the opinion is seriously flawed. In support of
his conclusion that only "detectable" increases constitute degradation, the
CJO wrote in a footnote that "[t]he element of detectability is implied in
EPA's regulations, which specify the conditions that must appear in an
NPDES permit."1 56 The footnote went on to cite EPA regulations and case
law that indicated that there must be some method of "measuring compli-
ance" in order to make permit conditions enforceable.
57
But these references are clearly inapplicable to the issue before the
EAB. The CJO might have evaluated the EPA's (or Oklahoma's) Tier 2 or
Tier 3 antidegradation regulations and concluded that they apply only upon
a showing of detectable degradation of water quality. But that was not what
the CJO did. Rather, he based his conclusion on NPDES permit regulations
that require that permit conditions include a means of ensuring detectable or
measurable violations. 58 Those permit regulations are, however, largely
irrelevant to the question of when the antidegradation provisions are trig-
gered by a finding of degradation or whether, once triggered, they prohibit
the issuance of an NPDES permit. It is one thing to say that permit limita-
tions must contain conditions that allow measurable enforcement; it is quite
another thing to say that antidegradation review (and possible prohibition of
new or expanded dischargers) is not required unless there is a detectable
increase in pollutants in the water body. If antidegradation review is trig-
gered and an NPDES permit is denied, there is no issue of subsequent en-
forcement of permit conditions. This is not to say that a standard of "no
degradation" is violated by hypothetical or undetectable increases in ambi-
ent levels of pollutants; it is to say that the CJO's analysis simply does ade-
quately address this issue.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at n.16.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 603.
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On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the EPA's position and crafted its
own interpretation. 59 Although not argued by any party, the Tenth Circuit
held that the CWA prohibits the issuance of an NPDES permit to a new
discharge that would reach waters that were already in violation of existing
water quality standards.' 6° In other words, the Tenth Circuit prohibited new
or expanded discharges into impaired waters. The court cited essentially
nothing, other than its incredulity that Congress could have intended, given
the "all-encompassing" program of the CWA, to allow such a result. 6 ' The
Tenth Circuit made an additional, critical point. The court agreed that "there
must be an initial, detectable change in the water quality of a particular
body of water for that water to qualify as 'degraded.' '1 62 Once this detect-
able change was found, however, the court would thereafter prohibit the
discharge of pollutants by a source. 163
Thus, the court seemed to say that the Oklahoma antidegradation provi-
sion does not apply unless there is a detectable change in stream quality,
but, once it applies, it prohibits undetectable discharges. It is hard to know
what to make of this. If antidegradation review is not triggered in the ab-
sence of a detectable change, what is the significance of thereafter prohibit-
ing undetectable discharges? The court seemed to confuse some abstract
state of "degraded" water from the finding that a particular source will
cause "degradation."
The Supreme Court, in Arkansas v. Oklahoma,'64 reversed the Tenth
Circuit and expressly upheld the position of the CJO. The Court rejected the
Tenth Circuit's position that the CWA contained a categorical ban on new
discharges to impaired waters. Rather than announcing its interpretation of
the requirements of the CWA, the Supreme Court relied on principles of
judicial deference to uphold the agency's decision. 65 The Court character-
ized the CJO ruling as stating "that the Oklahoma standards-which require
159. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
160. Id. at 632.
161. The court wrote:
Congress cannot reasonably be presumed to have intended to exclude from the CWA's "all-
encompassing program," ... a permitting decision arising in circumstances such as those of
this case. It is even more unfathomable that Congress fashioned a "comprehensive ... policy
for the elimination of water pollution," ... which sanctions continued pollution once mini-
mum water quality standards have been transgressed. More likely, Congress simply never
contemplated that EPA or a state would consider it permissible to authorize further pollution
under such circumstances. We will not ascribe to the Act either the gaping loophole or the
irrational purpose necessary to uphold EPA's action in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 633.
164. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
165. The Supreme Court stated, "Because we recognize that, at least insofar as they affect the issu-
ance of a permit in another State, the Oklahoma standards have a federal character, the EPA's reason-
able, consistently held interpretation of those standards is entitled to substantial deference." Id. at 110.
The Court cited to INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 189-90 (1991), and
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in support of this proposi-
tion. Id. The EPA's interpretation of state water quality standards is, thus, presumably subject to Chev-
ron deference, whatever that means. See infra note 171.
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that there be 'no degradation' of the upper Illinois River-would only be
violated if the discharge effected an 'actually detectable or measurable'
change in water quality."' 66 The Court stated that "[t]his interpretation ... is
certainly reasonable and consistent with the purposes and principles of the
Clean Water Act."'167 The Court went on to note, approvingly, the CJO's
position that "unless there is some method for measuring compliance, there




What can we infer from the CJO, Tenth Circuit, and Supreme Court
opinions in this case? At a minimum, these opinions are consistent with a
conclusion that antidegradation review is not triggered by a miniscule or
hypothetical decrease in water quality. The Supreme Court certainly did not
reject the Tenth Circuit's position that antidegradation review was only re-
quired upon a showing of a "detectible" change in water quality. Indeed, the
Ohio Supreme Court concluded that "a careful reading of [Arkansas v.
Oklahoma] reveals that the Supreme Court did not disagree with the percep-
tible change standard."'
' 69
The opinions, however, say nothing about the legitimacy of the EPA's
apparent position that antidegradation review can be limited to discharges
that cause "significant degradation." Indeed the CJO's opinion in the Arkan-
sas v. Oklahoma dispute suggests otherwise. 170 Further, since the Supreme
Court relied on principles of administrative deference to uphold the
agency's position, the EPA's failure to adopt a policy of "significant degra-
dation" in a binding administrative process raises questions about the extent
of deference that would be applied to its apparent position. "
7'
3. How Significant Is Significant?
Although the EPA apparently authorizes a "significant degradation" ap-
proach, the EPA has not defined how a significance test is to be applied.1
72
166. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110-11.
167. Id. at I11.
168. Id. The Court indicated that this construction was particularly appropriate in the interstate con-
text since it limited a state's ability to hold an effective veto over upstream discharges.
169. Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042, 1055 n.16 (Ohio
1992). The Ohio court went on to conclude that a finding of "perceptible change" did trigger the federal
antidegradation review provisions for Tier 2 waters. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
170. Arkansas, 503 U.S. 91.
171. There is considerable debate over what types of agency determinations are subject to Chevron
deference and what type of deference is applicable if Chevron does not apply. See Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (limiting application of Chevron deference to agency actions having the
force of law). See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 63 GEO. L.J.
833 (2001).
172. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. The EPA has stated specifically that "[tihe
current regulation does not specify a significance threshold below which an antidegradation review
would not be required." Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,783 (proposed
July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). Note, however, that the CJO's opinion in the Arkan-
sas v. Oklahoma dispute seemed to reject an interpretation of "degradation" that was limited to "signifi-
cant degradation." See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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In other words, the EPA has never said what level of water quality impact
mandates Tier 2 review under the federal antidegradation policy.
173
Courts have begun to address the issues associated with limiting the
scope of antidegradation review to "significant" or "non de minimis" dis-
charges. In some cases, the courts seem to have rejected a standard of "sig-
nificant degradation" and required antidegradation on a showing of a "de-
tectable" or "perceptible" change in water quality. In Columbus & Franklin
County Metropolitan Park District v. Shank, 74 the Ohio Supreme Court
rejected an argument that Ohio antidegradation review was triggered only if
a new discharge would result in the loss of an existing use. 175 Essentially
applying federal Tier 2 review requirements, the court apparently held that
review was triggered by a finding of any "perceptible" change in water
quality. 176 Thus, the court would not require review upon the addition of any
pollutants that resulted in a hypothetical change to water quality, but rather
only upon some detectible or quantifiable impact from the proposed dis-
charge. 177 The court did not consider, however, whether a policy that limited
review to "significant" degradation, short of loss of an existing use, would
be authorized.
Other courts have accepted some limitation of antidegradation review to
discharges causing only "significant" degradation. Courts, however, have
not given a free hand to a determination of significance. In Ohio Valley En-
vironmental Coalition v. Horinko,178 the court reviewed certain West Vir-
ginia water quality provisions that limited antidegradation review to "sig-
nificant" activities. Under these provisions, an individual activity was
deemed significant if it would use 10% or more of the remaining assimila-
tive capacity for the pollutant of concern. 179 Additionally, the proposed ac-
tivity was deemed "significant" if the "cumulative" effect of the proposed
activity together with "all other activities allowed after the baseline water
quality is established" would result in a reduction of 20% or more of the
remaining assimilative capacity.1
80
The court upheld the general approach of exempting de minimis dis-
charges from antidegradation review.' 8' In reaching this conclusion, the
173. See Great Lakes Guidance, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,366 (Mar. 23, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
9, 122, 123, 131, 132).
174. 600 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio Com. P1. 1992).
175. Id. at 1054.
176. Id. at 1055.
177. Some language in the opinion, however, does suggest that the court would require antidegrada-
tion review if there were any addition of pollutants. Although the court apparently concurred with the
lower court's use of a standard of "perceptible change" and cited with approval the "detectible change"
standard from the Tenth Circuit opinion in Oklahoma v. EPA, the court expressly concluded that "[tlhe
'degradation' of high quality waters within the meaning of Ohio Adm[in]. Code 3745-1-05 occurs
whenever the permitted activity increases the amount of pollutants." Id. at 1057. Presumably, the court
intended this to refer to a perceptible increase.
178. 279 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
179. Id. at 767.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 769.
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court largely relied on the EPA's statements in the 1998 ANPRM in which
the agency generally endorsed the concept of significant degradation.' 82 The
court also upheld the 10% standard for individual discharges.' 83 The court
noted that this was generally consistent with a policy the EPA had adopted
for antidegradation review in the Great Lakes.' 84 Although there were sig-
nificant differences between the West Virginia and Great Lakes policies, the
court nonetheless deferred to the EPA's position.
85
The court, however, gave no deference to the EPA's justification for ac-
cepting the 20% cumulative de minimis standard. 186 No deference was war-
ranted since the EPA apparently had nothing in the record to support its
decision. 87 Industry intervenors argued, based on some provisions of the
Great Lakes Guidance, that the 20% standard must be acceptable since, un-
der the 10% standard, individual dischargers could presumably, cumula-
tively, exhaust 90% of a water body's assimilative capacity.' 88 The court
stated that, if indeed the Great Lakes policy did stand for that proposition, it
"would reject that standard out of hand." 8 9 Intervenors also sought to rely
on the EPA's approval of a Colorado antidegradation provision that ex-
empted de minimis discharges that would "consume, after mixing, less than
15 percent of the baseline available increment, provided that the cumulative
increase in concentration from all sources shall not exceed 15 percent of the
baseline available increment."' 90 The court found that the EPA's approval
of the 15% provision in Colorado did not support approval of the 20% pro-
vision in West Virginia.' 9' Noting potentially significant differences be-
tween the two requirements, the court also stated that "fifteen percent is,
obviously, a lower figure than twenty percent. It remains the case that even
if fifteen percent is an acceptable figure, no party has offered evidence as to
why twenty percent is also an acceptable figure."
1 92
In Rivers Unlimited v. Schregardus,193 the Ohio Supreme Court consid-
ered a provision of the Ohio antidegradation provisions that would have
allowed allocation to "existing sources" of up to 80% of the available as-
similative capacity of high quality waters, as determined by appropriate
182. Id.; see also 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 131).
183. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
184. See supra note 117 for a discussion of the Great Lakes Guidance.
185. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 770-74.
186. Id. at 772.
187. Id. at 772 & n.33.
188. Id. at 771.
189. Id. The court went on to state: "It is hard to imagine how § 131.12(a)(2)'s command that 'water
quality shall be maintained and protected' would be satisfied by a provision that permitted a reduction in
water quality of as much as ninety percent of a water body's available assimilative capacity for any
given pollutant." Id.
190. Id. at 772.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Com. PI. 1997).
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TMDL procedures, without "further antidegradation review."' 194 New
sources would be subject to antidegradation requirements if their discharge
would result in a 10% or greater change in "ambient water quality."' 195 The
court concluded that allowing existing sources to degrade up to 80% of the
assimilative capacity without ensuring public participation conflicts with the
federal antidegradation requirement.
196
Thus, the EPA and the courts seem willing to limit antidegradation re-
view, and all that it implies, to discharges that will result in significant deg-
radation. What level of impact constitutes "significant" degradation remains
to be resolved. Even more significant, the question of "cumulative" impacts
lurks as the critical issue in this area. If "insignificant" discharges can be
exempt from review, what stops significant degradation from occurring
from numerous, unreviewed acts of insignificant degradation?
4. When Is Degradation Allowed?
A finding of "significant degradation" of Tier 2 water triggers a process,
not a result. If a new or expanded discharge will result in significant degra-
dation of a Tier 2 water, the antidegradation policy may still allow the dis-
charge if a number of conditions are satisfied.197 The EPA has described
these provisions as authorizing degradation "only in a few extraordinary
circumstances where the economic and social need for the activity clearly
outweighs the benefit of maintaining water quality above that required for
'fishable/swimmable' water, and both cannot be achieved."' 198 In practice,
degradation under this provision appears to be something other than "ex-
traordinary."
First, and perhaps of greatest significance, the antidegradation require-
ments contemplate a process of public participation. 199 At a minimum, this
apparently requires the state to provide some opportunity for a public hear-
ing on the proposed discharges. 200 Nothing is more frightening or expensive
to a discharger than the prospect of a public hearing.
194. Id. at 610.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 613.
197. The antidegradation policy may allow some degradation of high quality waters, but it flatly
prohibits degradation that will result in loss of an existing use. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (2003). In Ex
parte Fowl River Protective Assoc., 572 So. 2d 446 (Ala. 1990), the Alabama Supreme Court expressly
held that Alabama antidegradation provisions, equivalent to the federal policy, did not authorize elimina-
tion of an existing use based on a showing of necessity.
198. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-7.
199. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) requires "full satisfaction of the intergovernmental coordination and
public participation provisions of the State's continuing planning process" as a prerequisite to allowing
degradation of Tier 2 waters. As the court noted in Columbus & Franklin County Metropolitan Park
District v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992), "federal law requires these procedural safeguards
before degradation may be permitted." Id. at 1055.
200. The EPA has described how the public participation requirements may be satisfied:
This requirement may be satisfied in several ways. The State may obviously hold a public
hearing or hearings. The State may also satisfy the requirement by providing the opportunity
for the public to request a hearing. Activities which may affect several water bodies in a river
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Additionally, the antidegradation policy requires that a state determine
that any degradation is "necessary to accommodate important economic or
social development. '= 1 This phrase has a number of components.20 2 First,
degradation must be "necessary. 2 °3 This, in part, means that degradation
may not be allowed if the proposed new or expanded discharge can be ef-
fectively controlled by "reasonable" pollution control techniques.2° This
presumably includes some assessment of alternatives that will minimize or
eliminate the discharge. The EPA apparently does not require states to adopt
BMP controls over nonpoint sources in order to justify that degradation is
necessary.
2 °5
basin or sub-basin may be considered in a single hearing. To ease the resource burden on
both the State and public, standards issues may be combined with hearings on environmental
impact statements, water management plans, or permits. However, if this is done, the public
must be clearly informed that possible changes in water quality standards are being consid-
ered along with other activities. In other words, it is inconsistent with the water quality stan-
dards regulation to "back-door" changes in standards through actions on EIS's, wasteload al-
locations, plans, or permits.
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, app.G at 10.
In Rivers Unlimited v. Schregardus, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1997), the court discussed
some of the elements of public participation required by the EPA's antidegradation requirements. In
Save the Lake v. Schregardus, 752 N.E.2d 295 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), the court rejected claims that Ohio
failed to follow necessary public participation requirements in an antidegradation review. The Ohio
antidegradation provisions themselves established specific public notice and public hearing require-
ments, and the issues, as addressed by the court, largely involved questions of whether the process satis-
fied these Ohio, rather than federal, requirements.
201. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-8.
202. The EPA's Interim Economic Guidance describes the process as follows:
When performing an antidegradation analysis, the first question is whether the cost of the
pollution controls needed to maintain the high-quality water will interfere with development.
If not, then lower water quality is not "necessary" for the development to take place. If, on
the other hand, the costs will interfere with the development and lower water quality is "nec-
essary" for the development to take place, then the analysis must show that the development
would be an important economic and social development.
ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM ECONOMIC GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY STANDARDS WORKBOOK
1-6 to 1-7 (1995) (hereinafter INTERIM ECONOMIC GUIDANCE).
203. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (2003).
204. In its 1998 ANPRM, the EPA discussed satisfaction of a showing of "necessity":
An approach that has been recommended by EPA is to require the proponent of the proposed
activity to develop an analysis of pollution control/pollution prevention alternatives. In con-
ducting its antidegradation review, the State or Tribe then ensures that all feasible alternatives
to allowing the degradation have been adequately evaluated, and that the least degrading rea-
sonable alternative is implemented. Also, note that where less-degrading alternatives are
more costly than the pollution controls associated with the proposal, the State or Tribe should
determine whether the costs of the less-degrading alternative are reasonable.
1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,784 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131).
In Shank, the court held that justification of degradation under Tier 2 review required extensive
analysis of the feasibility of alternatives to a proposed discharge. Columbus & Franklin County Metro.
Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042, 1058 (Ohio 1992). The court, however, stated that this require-
ment was part of a showing of the "economic and social" impacts of the discharge, not a part of a show-
ing of "necessity." Id.
205 In its Water Quality Standards Handbook, the EPA states that point source degradation is unneces-
sary "if it could be partially or completely prevented through implementation of existing State-required
BMPs." WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-8. In context, the reference to
"state-required BMPs" indicates that the EPA does not view the antidegradation policy as a tool for
forcing states to adopt nonpoint source controls. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, degradation must be necessary in order to accommodate
"important economic or social development. '" 20 6 The EPA has never fully
articulated either the elements that must be included in an evaluation of
"economic and social development ' 20 7 or the substantive limitation, if any,
that this standard imposes on authorizing degradation.2 8 In 1995, the EPA
published Interim Economic Guidance relevant in making an antidegrada-
tion justification, and in that document, the EPA stated:
The use of the term "important" communicates a general sense of
the level of economic and social development. This provision is in-
tended to permit degradation of high-quality water bodies in only a
few extraordinary cases where the benefits of the economic or so-
cial development unquestionably outweigh the costs of lowering
water quality.2°
In this Interim Guidance, the EPA identified factors that should be consid-
ered in evaluating the economic consequences associated with a proposed
discharge.21°
This Interim Economic Guidance establishes a framework for evaluat-
ing the costs and justifications for several water quality standards programs,
including antidegradation review. The Interim Economic Guidance's great-
est detail comes in its description of a process for calculating the costs of
pollution control requirements necessary to comply with antidegradation
requirements. The document also provides information about the type of
information that may be relevant in assessing important economic or social
development, but little is said about determining whether economic or social
206. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (2003).
207. Id.
208. In Shank, the Ohio Supreme Court identified several factors that were relevant for an "eco-
nomic/social" assessment. These included an assessment of alternative control strategies and the impact,
and benefits, of a proposed discharge not only on the local area but also the "greater community." Shank,
600 N.E.2d at 1058. Indeed the court seemed to use the "economic and social" assessment as a vehicle to
encourage centralized waste treatment systems. Id. In Save the Lake v. Schregardus, 752 N.E.2d 295
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001), an Ohio appeals court reviewed the adequacy of "social-economic report" pre-
pared by the Ohio EPA in connection with an antidegradation review of proposed permits. The court
noted that the Ohio regulations, cited by the Ohio Supreme Court in Shank, required consideration of
thirteen factors, "including the cost-effectiveness and technical feasibility of nondegradation alternatives,
the reliability of the preferred alternative, and the condition of the local economy." Id. at 307 (citing
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-1-05(c)(6)(a)-(m)). The court held that the record supported the conclusions
made by the agency. Id.
In In re Petition of Town of Sherburne, 581 A.2d 274 (Vt. 1990), the Vermont Supreme Court
held that the Vermont Water Resources Board had properly justified, under the state's then-existing
antidegradation provision, its decision to reclassify certain waters. This reclassification was made to
support the development of clustered, rather than scattered, regional development. The court concluded
that the board "believed that any lowering of quality that might ensue from a reclassification would be
justified as necessary to accommodate important public development goals." Id. at 281.
209. INTERIM ECONOMIC GUIDANCE, supra note 202, at 1-3 to 1-4.
210. The EPA states that the intent of the Interim Economic Guidance is to "point States and dis-
chargers in the right direction. It does not give definitive answers as to whether or not an entity has
demonstrated substantial, widespread, or important economic and social impacts." Id. at 1-2.
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development justifies degradation. In its 1998 ANPRM, however, the EPA
stated that "current thinking is that determining the social and economic
importance of a proposed activity is an important public question best ad-
dressed by State, Tribal or local interests.2
Finally, degradation may be allowed only if the state shall assure that
"there shall be achieved the highest statutory and regulatory requirements
for all new and existing point sources and all cost-effective and reasonable
best management practices for nonpoint source control. '21 2 Overlooking the
oddly ambiguous use of passive voice in this phrase, the phrase seems to
establish minimum requirements for control of both point and nonpoint
sources.
The standard for new and existing point sources seems, at a minimum,
to require that the state have implemented required technology-based efflu-
ent limitations for point sources. The EPA has indicated that this phrase
does not impose any new or additional requirements for point sources but
simply requires effective implementation of existing requirements.1 3 At
least one court, however, has held that this provision imposes a new sub-
stantive standard of control. In Columbus & Franklin City Metropolitan
Park District v. Shank,2t 4 the court held that, under the antidegradation pro-
visions, a new facility would be required to meet effluent limitations, devel-
oped on a case-by-case basis, equivalent to that which would be required as
"new-source performance standards. 2t 5 Thus, in this view, the antidegrada-
tion provision would operate as a significant source of mandated effluent
limitations.
Additionally, the provision implies that new or expanded discharges are
prohibited unless the state has implemented BMPs for nonpoint sources.
This interpretation would make the antidegradation policy a major tool for
forcing states to adopt nonpoint source controls that are otherwise not re-
quired under the CWA. However clear the implication, the reality is that the
211. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,784 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131).
212. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2).
213. In its 1985 Questions & Answers document, EPA states that this phrase:
ensures that the limited provision for lowering water quality of high quality waters down to
"fishable/swimmable" levels will not be used to undercut the Clean Water Act requirements
for point source and non-point source pollution control. Furthermore, by ensuring compliance
with such statutory and regulatory controls, there is less chance that a lowering of water qual-
ity will be sought in order to accommodate new economic and social development.
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, app.G at 7-8.
214. 600 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992).
215. Id. at 1059-62. In many situations, a new discharger would not otherwise be subject to NSPS
under the CWA. New municipal sewage treatment plants (known in CWA-speak as "publicly owned
treatment works" or "POTWs") are only subject to a technology-based limit known as "secondary treat-
ment." New industrial dischargers that are not classified as a "new source" because there were no prom-
ulgated "NSPS" would normally be subject to limits representing BAT or BCT. Under the court's analy-
sis, all new dischargers subject to Tier 2 antidegradation review would be subject to a case-by-case
application of NSPS. The court, in part reached this conclusion based on its application of section 302 of
the CWA, which authorizes the imposition of more stringent effluent limitations to achieve water quality
goals, but only following a cost/benefit analysis. Id. This section has never been a significant aspect of
the EPA's water quality standards policies, and it has been used, rarely, if at all by the EPA.
2004]
Alabama Law Review
EPA does not, under the antidegradation policy, require states to adopt non-
point controls as a prerequisite for allowing growth. In its Water Quality
Standards Handbook, the EPA practically shouts that this provision "does
not REQUIRE a State to establish BMPs for non-point sources where such
BMP requirements do not exist. '' 216 Rather, the EPA indicates that this pro-
vision merely requires states to ensure that any nonpoint source controls that
states may otherwise have adopted are being implemented.2 7
C. The Relationship Between the Requirements for Impaired Waters
and Antidegradation Requirements
So how does this all fit together? What is the relationship between the
TMDL/WLA approach to attaining water quality standards and the antide-
gradation policy for maintaining water quality? Is there a coherent story of
the EPA's approach to growth in these provisions? The answer basically is
"nope."
There are several problems with integrating the TMDL/WLA process
for impaired waters with the separate antidegradation provisions. First, they
deal with two distinct problems. The TMDL/WLA process is intended to
improve water quality; the antidegradation policy is intended to maintain
water quality. The EPA itself cannot seem to understand the distinction and
included a proposed offset requirement, designed to ensure improved water
quality, as an amendment to its antidegradation policy.
21 8
Second, although the provisions deal with different issues, they overlap
in confusing ways when implemented. One might think that the two pro-
grams were mutually exclusive: the class of "impaired waters" not meeting
their designated uses was separate from the classes of Tier 1 and Tier 2 wa-
ters to which the antidegradation requirements apply. It certainly does not
work this way. The Tier 1 classification is not limited to waters attaining
water quality standards, and the Tier 1 prohibitions on loss of any existing
uses apply equally to all waters, whether impaired or not.
21 9
But the overlap is even more complicated than this. Apparently, a water
body can be both impaired and a high quality Tier 2 water. This conclusion
apparently follows from a "pollutant-by-pollutant" approach to water body
220classification. In other words, a water body can be impaired (not meeting
an applicable water quality criterion) for one pollutant but high quality with
respect to other pollutants. This scenario would presumably result in multi-
ple requirements, such as a WLA for the pollutants for which the water
body is impaired, and an antidegradation review if there is "significant deg-
216. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 4-8.
217. Id. See American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting view
that states are required to regulate nonpoint sources at the "antidegradation stage").
218. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
219. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,781 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131); see also supra Section II.
220. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,782-85; see also supra Section IL.
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radation" with respect to other pollutants. While there would be nothing
wrong with such an overlap, it is just not clear what policy the EPA cur-
rently follows.
Furthermore, the EPA has not integrated the classification schemes for
the two programs. The TMDL process is mandated by a classification of a
water body as an "impaired water" on a section 303(d) list.22' The antide-
gradation policy is based on a Tier I/Tier 2 classification.222 There is no
apparent existing relationship between the two lists. The EPA has sug-
gested, but not required, even the minimal step of encouraging use of data
from the two programs in making determinations.223 They remain distinct.
Thus, we are left with overlapping programs with little coordination or
connection. There is nothing wrong with overlap. One can be concerned
both with improving water quality for pollutants that are at concentrations
exceeding criteria values and maintaining quality for pollutants that are at
levels better than criteria values. The problem is not the overlap but the lack
of coherence and integration.
III. SLOUCHING TOWARDS A GROWTH POLICY
In the thirty-year history of the CWA, the EPA has never managed to
develop a comprehensive and coherent policy on growth. Perhaps this is not
surprising. The primary focus of the CWA has, until recently, been on de-
velopment and implementation of technology-based standards.224 For many,
this focus represents an appropriate choice and has resulted in substantial
reductions in the discharge of pollutants.225 The resurrection of an environ-
mental quality-based approach represented by the water quality standards
program, however, now requires the country to confront difficult issues
relating to environmental quality and growth.
Ultimately, the issue of growth under the CWA boils down to two ques-
tions. First, who should be required to reduce their discharge in order to
improve water quality sufficiently to achieve water quality goals? Second,
how much should we allow existing water quality to be degraded? Any an-
swer to these questions involves extremely complicated and contentious
technical questions of implementation and enforcement. But, at their cores,
these questions are ultimately ones of public policy and can be resolved
only by making difficult political decisions.
Acknowledging that issues are political does not mean there are no con-
clusions that can be drawn from the history of the treatment of growth under
the CWA.
221. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.
222. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,781-85.
223. Id. at 36,785.
224. See supra Section .
225. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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A. Clarify the Process of Developing Water Quality-Based
Effluent Limitations
As the EPA has acknowledged, there is tremendous variation and uncer-
tainty in the manner in which TMDL/WLA are used to establish
WQBELs. a26 Perhaps the single most significant step that the EPA could
take would be to establish clear and consistent requirements for developing
WQBELs. Such requirements would clarify the stage in the process in
which instream water quality and mixing zone considerations apply. The
role of the permit writer in integrating the WLA into a permit that ensures
water quality criteria are not violated at the boundaries of a mixing zone
would also be clarified. If stringent permit writing policies were in place,
new or expanded dischargers might face a difficult time in permitting,
which would alter the political pressures involved in undertaking a
TMDLIWLA review. The whole TMDL process, indeed the whole rationale
for the TMDLs, is suspect without clarity on these matters.
B. Allocate Responsibility for Attaining Designated Uses
Between Existing and New Sources of Pollution
Through a Revision to 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)
Achievement of water quality goals in impaired waters requires some-
body to reduce their discharge of pollutants. It is really that simple. The
greater the reductions that are required of existing sources, the greater the
capacity for growth. The less we require of existing sources, the greater the
impact on growth and expansion. This is not quantum physics; this is simple
math.
The EPA has essentially identified two mechanisms for allocating con-
trol responsibilities between existing and new sources of pollution. Through
growth allowances, states theoretically impose restrictions on existing
sources to reserve greater capacity for growth.227 This policy places the bur-
den of allocation on the state, and places more of the costs of compliance on
existing sources. Alternatively, the EPA has identified offsets as a possible
means of allocating reductions.228 Through offsets, control requirements are
reduced on existing sources and the costs of control fall more heavily on
new sources.
Either approach can work. There are different issues of implementation
depending on the approach that is used, but both are possible, and the ap-
proaches are not mutually exclusive. Offsets, for example, can supplement a
growth allowance program when the reserved allowances are inadequate to
account for growth.
226. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, the choice between these options can be left to the states.
What the EPA must do is ensure that whatever policy states adopt will be
effective to attain water quality standards. This will require some tough
decisions, but a simple mechanism exists.
The EPA could expand and toughen the provisions of section 122.4(i)
229
as the vehicle for integrating controls on new or expanded dischargers on
impaired waters. The EPA should prohibit issuance of permits to new or
significantly expanded discharges unless the discharger can establish that
there is (1) an available growth allowance established through an approved
TMDL process, or (2) an enforceable "offset" from existing dischargers.
Such an approach will require the EPA to clarify its requirements for
growth allowances. At the moment, a growth allowance policy lurks in the
interstices of the EPA regulations and guidance. The EPA needs to be more
explicit and detailed on the use of growth allowances to attain water quality
goals. Further, the EPA will need to revisit and seriously address the alter-
native of "offsets." This will require development of an improved water
trading program and require the EPA to confront the implementation proc-
ess for offsets.
There are, however, several advantages to such an approach. First, by
authorizing new or expanded discharges if there is either an allowance or an
offset, states will retain the authority to allocate responsibility and costs
between new or existing sources. If states do not establish a growth allow-
ance, they will have made the decision to impose compliance costs on new
sources. Second, the approach reverses the political pressure to develop
TMDLs. The regulated community may now have an incentive to encour-
age, rather than oppose, TMDLs if they will be able to avoid offsets through
the TMDL process. Third, the approach ensures some progress on improv-
ing water quality without the draconian use of a flat growth prohibition.23°
C. Revise the Antidegradation Policy
The EPA's antidegradation policy is deeply flawed and largely ineffec-
tive. It seems almost arbitrary in its standard for triggering antidegradation
review, and it is unclear on the limits it places on the ability of states to al-
low degradation of water quality. The EPA has also confused the relation-
ship between limits on degrading water quality and requirements to improve
water quality.
Several revisions to the antidegradation policy would make it more co-
herent. First, abandon the "Tiers." Whatever substantive standard for
antidegradation is applied, it should apply to all waters, and antidegradation
229. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2003).
230. There is some support for the view that 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) currently prohibits the permitting of
new or expanded dischargers. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text. But a flat new source
prohibition as a means of forcing compliance with water quality standards is simply a political train
wreck waiting to happen. Can you spell "backlash"? A new source prohibition was a disaster under the
Clean Air Act, and it would be a disaster under the CWA.
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review should not hinge on a confused and arbitrary classification of waters.
This could be done simply by revising the antidegradation requirement to
prohibit both (1) the loss of an existing use at any time, and (2) the "signifi-
cant degradation" of any water unless there has been full antidegradation
review. This would require the use of the "pollutant-by-pollutant" approach
for assessing water quality, but it would avoid debates over application of
antidegradation requirements based on metaphysical classification of wa-
ters.23'
Alternatively, the EPA could integrate the "impaired waters" lists from
section 303(d) with the application of antidegradation requirements. Im-
paired waters on the section 303(d) lists would be subject to the prohibition
on loss of existing uses but subjected to the mandatory TMDL/WLA proc-
ess. All waters not on the section 303(d) lists would be subject to the exist-
ing Tier 2 "high quality" waters provisions. This would simplify the deter-
mination of applicable requirements and alter the political incentives to
identify waters as "impaired."
Second, clarify the standard for triggering antidegradation review. At
the moment, it appears (although the EPA has not been clear or consistent)
that antidegradation review under Tier 2 is triggered only on a finding of
significant degradation. 232 There is enormous variation among states on
this issue, and the EPA has failed to take responsibility to address the mat-
ter. The EPA should also clarify that the determination of "significant deg-
radation" is relevant only for triggering antidegradation review; it is not a
substantive standard that prohibits discharges.
Third, the EPA needs to clarify the procedural aspects of antidegrada-
tion review. Under what circumstances is antidegradation review satisfied
by the TMDL/WLA process? In other words, if a state allocates a WLA that
authorizes expanded discharge, has the TMDL process itself satisfied any
required antidegradation review, or is additional review required during the
permit issuance process? Similarly, the EPA needs to clarify whether the
public participation requirements applicable to NPDES permit issuance
satisfy antidegradation review requirements. If they do, the "burden" of
adding an expanded antidegradation review is minimized if it is simply an
added component to permit issuance.
Finally, the EPA needs to clarify the substantive requirements for justi-
fying degradation. Under the current policy, degradation of high quality
waters is allowed, following a public process, to "accommodate important
economic or social development. 233 This policy has created controversy
and confusion as to the federal limits on growth. One option is to abandon
231. This is consistent with the approach the EPA has adopted in its Great Lakes Guidance. Great
Lakes Guidance, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,366, 15,412-13 (Mar. 23, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122,
123, 131, 132).
232. 1998 ANPRM, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,783 (proposed July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131).
233. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (2003).
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any pretense that the antidegradation policy imposes a substantive limit on a
state's ability to allow degradation of water quality. The EPA should instead
require a public process of debate and a formal documentation of a state's
justification for allowing growth. Antidegradation, like the NEPA process,
should be a largely procedural vehicle for forcing issues to be publicly con-
fronted.234
There is a final, and largely coherent, picture that emerges from this set
of recommendations. TMDLIWLAs are mandated on impaired waters, and
no new discharger or significant expansion by an existing discharger is au-
thorized in the absence of an available growth allowance or offset. Any new
or expanded dischargers will also generally be subject to antidegradation
review as part of the TMDL or NPDES process if their proposed new dis-
charge will result in "significant degradation" of a pollutant exceeding crite-
ria values. This policy makes sense to me.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CWA is now thirty years old. Much has been accomplished, but
more remains to be done. Reliance on technology-based standards has al-
lowed the EPA to avoid resolving the difficult social policy issues inherent
in the water quality standards program. Certainly, the EPA has avoided re-
solving the difficult issues involved in the relationship between the attain-
ment of water quality goals and the allowance for growth. At this stage of
development of the CWA, it is getting more difficult to avoid the problems.
What may be the most surprising aspect of this issue is that nothing has
changed since the CWA was first adopted. The tools available in 1972 may
be the only tools that are necessary to address the issues today. In other
words, the fault lies not in the statute but in ourselves if the issues remain
unresolved.
234. It is important to stress that such a policy would only apply to the issue of "significant degrada-
tion." A prohibition on loss of existing uses should independently be applied. This issue, although diffi-
cult to resolve, involves far more of a factual rather than a policy dispute. It is even more important to
stress that a policy of "significant degradation" is also independent of the substantive requirements that
are imposed on existing and new sources on impaired waters.
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